An Interview with Miranda Fricker

Dieleman, Susan

doi:10.1080/02691728.2011.652216

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Las narrativas hegemónicas que circulan hoy sobre los "presos comunes" y el destino que corren en 3 José Medina (2013, p. 50) distingue resistencia "positiva" y "negativa" de la siguiente forma: mientras que la primera "es crítica, desenmascara prejuicios y sesgos, [y] reacciona a conjuntos de ignorancia", la segunda "involucra una reticencia a aprender o una negativa a creer -el tipo de tozudez que obstaculiza el conocimiento". Si bien Fricker inicialmente (Dieleman & Fricker, 2012;Fricker, 2007) niega que haya un perpetrador en la injusticia hermenéutica, coincido con Medina (2013, p. 97) las cárceles, con implicancias particularmente en términos de responsabilidad (de la persona y de las instituciones hacia ella), derechos, etc., son las mismas que circulaban cuando se hablaba de "Motín de los colchones". Esta constatación sirve también de aliciente para avanzar con el análisis que propongo aquí, que se refiere a un evento en el pasado pero también a sus correlatos en el presente.…”

Section: De Motín a Masacreunclassified

El pasado práctico como instrumento de resistencia epistémica: el caso de la Masacre en el Pabellón Séptimo

Pérez

2022

Estud.filos

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El trabajo aplica los marcos teóricos de la injusticia epistémica y la filosofía narrativista de la historia para leer el proceso de resignificación de un acontecimiento que tuvo lugar en una cárcel de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina, en 1978, denominado “Masacre en el Pabellón Séptimo” o “Motín de los colchones”. A través del caso se indaga en el ejercicio de la resistencia epistémica mediante la expansión categorial, para lo cual se recurre a los desarrollos más recientes en torno a la injusticia hermenéutica como carencia en la aplicación (ya no sólo en el contenido) de los conceptos disponibles. Esto permite caracterizar el caso analizado como un ejemplo de injusticia hermenéutica, y destacar algunas características de dicha injusticia que permanecen sub-analizados en la literatura especializada, vinculados con la agencia, la temporalidad, y las formas concretas que toma la resistencia. Entre estas últimas se destaca el rol que juega -o puede jugar- el ejercicio de lo que en filosofía de la historia se ha denominado “pasado práctico”, entendido como una intervención en la disputa de significados sobre el pasado, nacida de un compromiso con el presente. Para concluir se presentan algunas advertencias a considerar en el estudio de la injusticia epistémica en el contexto de instituciones tales como la cárcel.

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Section: De Motín a Masacreunclassified

El pasado práctico como instrumento de resistencia epistémica: el caso de la Masacre en el Pabellón Séptimo

Pérez

2022

Estud.filos

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“…No such efforts will be made if a negative judgment of the credibility status of the speaker is in place. On the other hand, Fricker has a point when she declares that hermeneutical injustice usually precedes testimonial injustice: "Lacking the conceptual and interpretive tools you need to [render intelligible] some significant patch of your social experience is prior the difficulties of getting your word received without prejudice once you have put your thoughts together in intelligible form" (Dieleman 2012). It is my hypothesis that (1) the Dutch sociopolitical imagination (and I assume this goes for many Western societies) has been penetrated by a very specific understanding of what religion (ideally speaking) should be (i.e., good religion) and what it should not be (bad religion).…”

Section: Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

Interreligious Learning, Ricoeur, and the Problem of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice

Moyaert

2019

Journal of Nationalism, Memory &Amp; Language Politics

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Ricoeur’s philosophy of religion as well as his suggestion that we may consider interreligious dialogue as a specific form of linguistic hospitality has inspired many to think through the challenges of interfaith learning in a post-secular age. I am one of those scholars who have found Ricoeur a particularly helpful conversation partner as I sought to create a nonviolent and transformative space of encounter in my interreligious classroom. In this article, I elaborate on how my lived experiences as an interreligious educator have made me wonder if Ricoeur’s philosophy of religion and his plea for interreligious hospitality are not actually limiting the critical potential of interreligious education. Ricoeur’s interreligious hermeneutics strongly resonates with a modern (Protestant) understanding of religion and its implicit, normative distinction between good (mature) and bad (immature) religiosity, which to this day belongs to the sociopolitical imagination of the majority in most Western European countries (this is certainly true for the Netherlands). It has been my pedagogical experience that this distinction between good and bad religion contributes to and reinforces testimonial and hermeneutical injustice in my classroom, which results in the marginalization of some of my students, especially those whose religious practice does not fit the understanding of what religion ought to be.

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“…So, hermeneutical injustices arise when a speaker struggles in the context of a hermeneutical climate that lacks adequate resources, but her “performative style… can be insufficiently collectively understood too, and in a way that presents a case of hermeneutical injustice which mirrors the content‐centred version” (Fricker in Dieleman , 257). In other words, a speaker can suffer hermeneutical injustices both because of what she says (or, more accurately, is unable to say) as well as how she says it.…”

Section: Epistemic Justice In Deliberative Spacesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In an interview published in 2012, Fricker states that one of the things she wants to think about, following the publication of Epistemic Injustice, is “the role of both testimonial and hermeneutical justice in the democratic polity—in securing, for instance, political legitimacy, or freedom of speech, or even political freedom” (Fricker in Dieleman , 260). She also hopes, she states toward the end of the interview, that others will take up the task of exploring connections between epistemic justice and public deliberation.…”

Section: Introduction: Who Has a Duty To Be Epistemically Just?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Justice and Democratic Legitimacy

Dieleman¹

2015

Hypatia

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The deliberative turn in political philosophy sees theorists attempting to ground democratic legitimacy in free, rational, and public deliberation among citizens. However, feminist theorists have criticized prominent accounts of deliberative democracy, and of the public sphere that is its site, for being too exclusionary. Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser, and Seyla Benhabib show that deliberative democrats generally fail to attend to substantive inclusion in their conceptions of deliberative space, even though they endorse formal inclusion. If we take these criticisms seriously, we are tasked with articulating a substantively inclusive account of deliberation. I argue in this article that enriching existing theories of deliberative democracy with Fricker's conception of epistemic in/justice yields two specific benefits. First, it enables us to detect instances of epistemic injustice, and therefore failures of inclusion, within deliberative spaces. Second, it can act as a model for constructing deliberative spaces that are more inclusive and therefore better able to ground democratic legitimacy.

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An Interview with Miranda Fricker

Cited by 11 publications

References 2 publications

El pasado práctico como instrumento de resistencia epistémica: el caso de la Masacre en el Pabellón Séptimo

El pasado práctico como instrumento de resistencia epistémica: el caso de la Masacre en el Pabellón Séptimo

Interreligious Learning, Ricoeur, and the Problem of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice

Epistemic Justice and Democratic Legitimacy

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