An International Comparison and Assessment of the Structure of Bank Supervision

Barth, James R.; Dopico, Luis G.; Nolle, Daniel E.; Wilcox, John M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.306764

Cited by 22 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 54 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Recent research, such as that by Barth et al (2002Barth et al ( , 2003Barth et al ( , 2004, on cross-country supervisory frameworks emphasizes the importance and the need for enhanced transparency that can be obtained by the disclosure of relevant information and the reinforcement of market discipline. Empirical evidence supports market discipline that is based on improved financial information disclosures, and enhancing market participants' ability to assess and control banks' risks in the U.S. and Europe.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Depositors’ Assessment of Bank Riskiness in the Russian Federation

2007

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Depositors’ Assessment of Bank Riskiness in the Russian Federation

2007

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…4 See, for example, Barth, Nolle, and Rice (2000), and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2002). 5 Barth, Dopico, Nolle, and Wilcox (2002b) summarize the relatively small amount of recent literature on the structure of supervision, noting that it is largely conceptual, as compared to empirical, in nature. Taylor (2001) state, ''.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 5 Barth, Dopico, Nolle, and Wilcox (2002b) summarize the relatively small amount of recent literature on the structure of supervision, noting that it is largely conceptual, as compared to empirical, in nature. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Cross‐Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance

Barth¹,

Nolle²,

Phumiwasana³

et al. 2003

Financial Market

Self Cite

176

107

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Ongoing changes in the structure and nature of banking, as well as banking crises across the globe have focused the attention of policy makers on the appropriate structure, scope, and degree of independence of banking supervision. Key issues for banking supervision structure are whether there should be one or multiple supervisory authorities, and whether the central bank should be involved in bank supervision. The issue pertaining to the scope of supervision is whether bank supervisory authorities should supervise other financial service industries, including in particular securities and insurance. Finally, the issue regarding the independence of supervisory authorities is the degree to which bank supervisors should be subject to political and economic policy pressure and influence. How these issues are addressed is important, because policies that fail to provide for an appropriate bank supervisory framework may undermine bank performance and even lead to full-scale banking crises.The intense interest policy makers have shown in these issues has not been matched, however, by researchers. In particular, there is very little systematic empirical evidence on how, or indeed whether, the structure, scope, or independence of bank supervision affects the banking industry. This paper addresses this gap in three respects. First, drawing on the existing literature, we discuss the various policy issues surrounding the structure, scope, and degree of independence of bank supervision. Second, we provide comparative information on the actual choices that have been made regarding these three aspects of supervision across a wide range of developed and emerging market economies. Third, using both country-specific data for 55 countries in all parts of the world, and data for over 2,300 individual banks in those countries, we examine the relationship between the structure, scope, and independence of bank supervision and one key dimension of the banking industrybank profitability. Our results indicate, at most, a weak influence for the structure of supervision on bank performance. In particular, we find some evidence that a single-supervisor system enhances bank performance. However, following our discussion of the caution one must use in interpreting data on the supervisory framework, our re-estimates using an alternative source of data on the structure of supervision failed to duplicate this result.Our results have a bearing on a key dimension of the policy debate on how to structure supervision. In particular, given the dearth of empirical evidence on the issues, advocates of one form or another of supervisory structure have asserted that a particular change is likely to affect (favorably or adversely, as the advocate sees fit) the performance of banks. Our results provide little support at best to the belief that any particular bank supervisory structure will greatly affect bank performance. This is significant, because it suggests that the on-going debate might more broadly focus on the impact of the supervisory structure on o...

show abstract

“…Barth, Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox (2002) find that countries with multiple supervisors tend to have lower capital adequacy ratios and hence higher insolvency risk (they take this as evidence of the "competition in laxity").…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles

Garicano

Lastra

2010

Journal of International Economic Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we use insights from organizational economics and financial regulation to study the optimal architecture of supervision. We suggest that the new architecture should revolve around the following principles: (i) banking, securities and insurance supervision should be further integrated; (ii) macro prudential supervisory function must be in the hands of the central bank; (iii) the relation between macro and micro supervisors must be articulated through a management by exception system involving direct authority of the macro supervisor over enforcement and allocation of tasks; (iv) given the difficulty of measuring output on supervisory tasks, the systemic risk supervisor must necessarily be more accountable and less independent than Central Banks are on their monetary task; (v) the supervisory agency cannot rely on high powered incentives to motivate supervisors, and must rely on culture instead; (vi) the supervisor must limit its reliance on self regulation; and (vii) the international system should substitute the current loose, networked structure for a more centralized and hierarchical one.

show abstract

An International Comparison and Assessment of the Structure of Bank Supervision

Cited by 22 publications

References 54 publications

Depositors’ Assessment of Bank Riskiness in the Russian Federation

Depositors’ Assessment of Bank Riskiness in the Russian Federation

A Cross‐Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance

Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About