An intermittent-driven supply-current equalizer for 11x and 4x power-overhead savings in CPA-resistant 128bit AES cryptographic processor

Miura, Noriyuki; Fujimoto, Daisuke; Korenaga, Rie; Matsuda, Kohei; Nagata, Makoto

doi:10.1109/asscc.2014.7008901

Cited by 15 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In this context, the security features of the AES-128 has been increased against CPA and CEMA by 73× and 25× respectively when compared with conventional S-Box. When comparing with reported hiding counterparts, SCCE [9] and iSCE [10], which can only protect the AES-128 algorithm against CPA attack, our proposed AHLUT S-Box can protect the AES-128 algorithm against EM based attack (CEMA) as well as in the CPA. Fig.…”

Section: Measurement Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Highly-Secured Arithmetic Hiding cum Look-Up Table (AHLUT) based S-Box for AES-128 Implementation

Pammu¹,

Chong²,

Gwee³

2017

Adv. sci. technol. eng. syst. j.

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Section: Measurement Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The hiding techniques based on block level approach are a Switching Capacitor Current Equalizer (SCCE) [9], an intermittent Supply-Current Equalizer (iSCE) [10] and A Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Switching (DVFS) [11]. The SCCE is the same principal as in the TDPL.…”

Section: Wwwastesjcom 421mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Highly-Secured Arithmetic Hiding cum Look-Up Table (AHLUT) based S-Box for AES-128 Implementation

Pammu¹,

Chong²,

Gwee³

2017

Adv. sci. technol. eng. syst. j.

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“…Supply-Current Equalizer [15] 128bit Composite-Type AES Cryptographic Core 480m Fig.10 Die photo of 0.18m CMOS test chip. …”

Section: Dual Sensor Coilsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Supply-Current Equalizer [15] 128bit Composite-Type AES Cryptographic Core 480m Fig.11 Test setup. In addition, this sensor coil does not require a high Q factor since the jitter in the sensor oscillator has no impact on the detection accuracy because of averaging functionality in the counter-based detection logic.…”

Section: Dual Sensor Coilsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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EM attack sensor

Miura

Fujimoto

Nagata

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference

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Smart Card 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 Mobile Defense Vehicle Server Hardware Security Fig.1 Current existing application field of hardware security. Smart Card 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 Mobile Defense Vehicle Server Hardware Security Smart Card 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 Smart Card 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 Mobile Mobile Defense Vehicle Vehicle Server Hardware Security Hardware Security Fig.1 Current existing application field of hardware security.A side-channel attack exploiting EM-field leakage from a cryptographic processor IC is an existing serious threat to our information society. EM radiation during the IC operation is captured by an EM probe and the correlation to the crypto processing is statistically analyzed to reveal the secret information although it is protected in a software (algorithm) domain. This paper presents a reactive hardware (implementation) domain countermeasure against this EM attack, namely EM attack sensor. An on-chip sensor coil detects EM probe approach and reacts to protect the secret information from the tamper attack. The sensor concept and low-cost digital circuit implementation are reviewed, and the detail of the design-automation methodology highlycompatible to standard EDA tools is presented. A small hardware overhead of the sensor is silicon-proven in an actual 0.18m CMOS test-chip implementation together with a 128bit AES crypto core. The test-chip measurements demonstrate successful sensor operation against the actual EM probe attack.Cryptographic processing is one of the mandatory tools to preserve the information security and privacy. Recent advanced cryptographic algorithms can significantly enhance the security level and the data protection capability is mathematically proven safe in a software (algorithm) domain. However the security hole is often found in a hardware (implementation) domain. The malicious attacker can exploit some physical hardware-related information to break the code. Since all the cryptographic processing is by necessity performed in a hardware IC chip, hardware security would finally be an essential technical challenge.

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