An intentional interpretive perspective

Abstract

To the extent that the concept of intention has been addressed within behavior analysis, descriptions of intention have been general and have not specifically included important distinctions that differentiate a behavior-analytic approach from vernacular definitions of intention. A fundamental difference between a behavior-analytic approach and most other psychological approaches is that other approaches focus on the necessity of intentions to explain behavior, whereas a behavior-analytic approach is directed at understanding the interplay between behavior and environment. Behavior-analytic interpretations include the relations between the observer's behavior and the environment. From a behavior-analytic perspective, an analysis of the observer's interpretations of an individual's behavior is inherent in the subsequent attribution of intention. The present agenda is to provide a behavior-analytic account of attributing intention that identifies the establishing conditions for speaking of intention. Also addressed is the extent to which we speak of intentions when the observed individual's behavior is contingency shaped or under instructional control.

Intencionalidade em tomasello, searle, dennett e em abordagens comportamentais da cognição humana

“…Essas circunstâncias envolvem geralmente condições internas dos indivíduos (Hineline, 2003) ou verbalizações em situações de controle instrucional (Neuman, 2004).…”

“…No entanto, podemos sugerir como alternativa para conciliar esse conceito com pressupostos funcionalistas, considerar a intenção como comportamentos pré-correntes, i.e., comportamentos que maximizam a probabilidade de reforçamento de comportamentos subseqüentes (ver também Neuman, 2004Neuman, , 2007.…”

On terms

“…In both cases, the focus is on the observer's attribution of intentions as causes of behavior rather than on the role of intentions in the actor's behavior. Hineline (2003) and Neuman (2004) did not provide traditional operational definitions of intention, but rather, they were consistent with behavior-analytic operationism (Skinner, 1945). The distinction between operational definitions and Skinner's operationism is essential because the former could result in reification of intentions, and the latter is likely to result in clarification of what is going on when we speak of intention and of the contingencies that maintain this speaking.…”

“…Although not traditionally a topic for behavior analysis, the circumstances in which we speak of intentions and the situations in which observers attribute intentions as causes of behavior have recently been addressed by behavior analysts (Hineline, 2003;Neuman, 2004). Hineline stressed the misdirective nature of intentional terms that results in observers looking within actors for sources of behavior rather than at current and past contingencies, and how these misdirections come to occur.…”

“…There are three obvious reasons why those outside the field of behavior analysis would not accept a behavior-analytic account of intention. First and foremost, a behavior-analytic approach to intentions does not treat them as causes of behavior (Hineline, 2003;Neuman, 2004). Rachlin (1994) described efficient and final causation as two of the four elements of Aristotle's conception of cause.…”