An intensive survey of fair non-repudiation protocols

Kremer, Steve; Markowitch, Olivier; Zhou, Jianying

doi:10.1016/s0140-3664(02)00049-x

Cited by 222 publications

(164 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…The application of our approach to more meaningful fair exchange protocols, such as those described in [7], remains future research. Murray's fairness constraint was added as a premise of the liveness property, i.e., SEF ⇒ φ, where SEF was constructed as the conjunction over the potentially large set of events Σ.…”

Section: Discussion and Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Liveness properties are not satisfiable under this assumption as the DY intruder may choose not to communicate any message sent. Fair exchange protocols rely upon the assumption that at least some messages are communicated using resilient channels in order to satisfy certain liveness properties [7]. In this section we construct a new intruder model for reasoning about liveness properties of fair exchange protocols in the presence of resilient channels.…”

Section: An Intruder Model In Csp For Verifying Livenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, liveness properties, such as ♦flag, can never be guaranteed in this model, even under the assumption of strong event fairness. It is for this reason that fair exchange protocols rely upon the assumption that at least some messages are communicated over resilient channels [7]. Our revised intruder, which can choose not to communicate any message, requires further revision to capture Cederquist and Dashti's resilient channel assumption, RCC 1 .…”

Section: An Intruder Model Without Resilient Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, such an intruder model trivially breaks liveness properties, as the DY intruder may choose not to communicate any message sent. Fair exchange protocols often rely upon the assumption that at least some messages are communicated using resilient channels [7], which eventually deliver each message [8]. In this paper we construct a CSP model of an intruder constrained by a resilient communication channel assumption, based on work by Cederquist and Dashti [9], that can be used to verify liveness properties in fair exchange protocols using the fairness constraints proposed by Murray [4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Model Checking under Fairness in ProB and Its Application to Fair Exchange Protocols

Williams

Ruiter

Fokkink

2012

Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2012

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Abstract. Motivated by Murray's work on the limits of refinement testing for CSP, we propose the use of ProB to check liveness properties under assumptions of strong and weak event fairness, whose refinement-closures cannot generally be expressed as refinement checks for FDR. Such properties are necessary for the analysis of fair exchange protocols in CSP, which assume at least some messages are sent over a resilient channel. As the properties we check are refinement-closed, we retain CSP's theory of refinement, enabling subsequent step-wise refinement of the CSP model. Moreover, we improve upon existing CSP models of fair exchange protocols by proposing a revised intruder model inspired by the one of Cederquist and Dashti. Our intruder model is stronger as we use a weaker fairness constraint.

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Section: Discussion and Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: An Intruder Model In Csp For Verifying Livenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: An Intruder Model Without Resilient Channelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Model Checking under Fairness in ProB and Its Application to Fair Exchange Protocols

Williams

Ruiter

Fokkink

2012

Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2012

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“…In particular, assurance of fairness is fundamental when the exchanged items include any kind of evidences of non-repudiation, for this constitutes a key service in most of the previously mentioned applications. As a result, fair non-repudiation has experienced an explosion of proposals in recent years (see [10]) for an excellent survey).…”

Section: Fairness and Rationality In Exchange Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Extended Model of Rational Exchange Based on Dynamic Games of Imperfect Information

Alcaide

Tapiador

Hernández-Castro

et al. 2006

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. The notion of rational exchange introduced by Syverson in 1998 is a particularly interesting alternative when an efficient scheme for fair exchange is required but the use of a trusted third party is not allowed. A rational exchange protocol cannot provide fairness, but it ensures that rational (i.e. self-interested) parties would have no reason to deviate from the protocol. Buttyán et al (2003) have recently pointed out how rationality in exchange protocols can be formalized and studied within the framework provided by Game Theory. In this paper, we identify some vulnerabilities in Syverson's protocol which were not detected by Buttyán et al's analysis. These motivate us to extend the model to consider new aspects, never formalized before when analyzing security protocols. These aspects are related to participants' reputation, protocol's robustness, and the impact that scenarios where the protocol is executed repeatedly have on the outcome of the protocol execution.

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Network Security and Attack Defense

Zheng

Jamalipour

2008

Wireless Sensor Networks

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An intensive survey of fair non-repudiation protocols

Cited by 222 publications

References 17 publications

Model Checking under Fairness in ProB and Its Application to Fair Exchange Protocols

Model Checking under Fairness in ProB and Its Application to Fair Exchange Protocols

An Extended Model of Rational Exchange Based on Dynamic Games of Imperfect Information

Network Security and Attack Defense

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