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2013
DOI: 10.1587/elex.10.20130602
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An intelligent classification method for Trojan detection based on side-channel analysis

Abstract: Abstract:Side-channel analysis is an important strategy for Hardware Trojan (HT) detection. Karhunen-Love (K-L) expansion can be used to improve side-channel signals analysis quality, As an auxiliary post-processing method of K-L expansion, One Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) is introduced to achieve ICs intelligent classification. With the OCSVM and the power traces of Genuine ICs (Genuines), a hyper sphere can be built to distinguish the Trojan ICs (Trojans) from Genuines. The effectiveness of the propo… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Postsilicon detection mainly divides into three categories: side channel analysis, reverse engineering and functional testing. Among them, side channel analysis [3], which is widely applied, compares IC characteristics such as delay, power consumption, and temperature with a golden chip, i.e., malware-free chips. Detecting these malicious events usually requires a golden reference model [4] that is assumed to be Trojan-free.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Postsilicon detection mainly divides into three categories: side channel analysis, reverse engineering and functional testing. Among them, side channel analysis [3], which is widely applied, compares IC characteristics such as delay, power consumption, and temperature with a golden chip, i.e., malware-free chips. Detecting these malicious events usually requires a golden reference model [4] that is assumed to be Trojan-free.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Detecting these malicious events usually requires a golden reference model [4] that is assumed to be Trojan-free. The main drawback of the golden reference model is that it may be inconclusive or too complex for exhaustive verification, especially for large designs [3]. Another fundamental limitation of side channel approach is that the effect of a small enough Trojan on both of the logic and sidechannel fingerprints of the circuit, can be masked by process variation and noise.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These pre-silicon Trojan detection approaches provide a reliable guarantee for the trustworthiness of the circuits before tape out. In the post-silicon stage, however, the side channel based methods [5,6,7] are more flexible and easy to implement, where I/O ports and side-channel parameters are utilized to find abnormal behaviors introduced by the Trojans. While various HT detection approaches have been explored by many researchers, statistical side-channel analysis has been among the most heavily investigated ones [8].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Post-silicon detection mainly includes side channel analysis, reverse engineering and functional testing. Among them, side channel analysis [2] is widely applied which compares IC characteristics such as delay time, power consumption, and temperature with a golden chip that does not contain any HTs, unfortunately, a golden chip is usually hard to get in practice. On the other hand, pre-silicon design methods often detect HTs on gated level netlists, which can be categorized into two types: the dynamic and static detection.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%