An Information Secrecy Game in Cognitive Radio Networks

Abstract

Abstract-Although cognitive radio technology improves efficiency of spectrum utilization, primary users usually do not gain from opening up the spectrum in the opportunistic spectrum access, and sometimes even suffer from collisions due to secondary users' imperfect spectrum sensing. However, in this paper, we show that if information secrecy is a concern, primary users could actually be better off by allowing secondary users to cooperatively share the spectrum. Specifically, we propose a new cooperation paradigm in cognitive radio networks that primary users improve secrecy with the help of trustworthy secondary users, in the presence of an intelligent and passive eavesdropper attempting to decode primary users' messages. After deriving the achievable pair of primary users' secrecy rate and secondary users' transmission rate under various circumstances, we model the interaction between primary users and secondary users as a Stackelberg game in which transmission power levels are the key to maximize data rates. Moreover, based on a 2-D representation of how achievable rates depend on power-level regions, we apply equilibrium analysis to understand the optimal strategy of primary and secondary users. Finally, simulation results are presented to verify the performance.

Cooperative Jamming-Assisted Untrusted Relaying Based on Game Theory for Next-Generation Communication Systems

“…However, it appears that we only need N = 3 CJs in our case, when the SNR used is 10 dBm. We can also see from Figure 6 that our proposed algorithms outperform the baseline Stackelberg in [46] and the power control algorithm in [48]. The optimized α * and β * chosen by the source, as well as the average optimized CJ power of all N CJs given by P * CJ = 1 N ∑ N i P * CJ i , are shown in Figures 6 and 7.…”

“…Our second set of simulations explores the effect of increasing the number of CJs, i.e., N, when both the Stackelberg game and power control game were invoked for optimal performance. We compare our results with the baseline Stackelberg and the power-controlbased algorithms in [46,48]. The optimum values of α and β are determined by the source, while the optimum jammer power values are determined by the jammer, as seen in the Stackelberg leader-follower game in Figure 3.…”

“…Game theoretic secrecy maximization techniques have been investigated in [34,46,47]. Jamming through non-altruistic nodes was considered in [48], where the communication is secured through these nodes, and in return, they are considered as the SUs in the network.…”

“…Specifically, the jammers would be given access to the spectrum of the PUs for their secondary transmissions. Furthermore, a Stackelberg-based game was presented in [46], for the enhancement of the PU's secrecy rate. In the study by Al et al in [49], a cognitive radio network (CRN) was examined, consisting of a primary transmission involving a PU transmitter (PT) and PU receiver (PR), as well as a secondary transmission involving an SU transmitter (ST) and SU receiver (SR).…”

Evolutionary Game-Based Secrecy Rate Adaptation in Wireless Sensor Networks

“…A Stackelberg game is investigated to reflect interactions between the source that pays jammers for their interference and jammers who charge the source with a certain price for the jamming. Different from [21], a Stackelberg game [18] between primary users and secondary users in cognitive radio networks is modeled to maximize transmission rates of secondary users. Consequently, primary users’ secrecy rates are improved with the help of trustworthy secondary users.…”