1998
DOI: 10.11130/jei.1998.13.3.400
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An Industrial Analysis of Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of NAFTA

Abstract: We l f a r e effects of economic integration are often studied with aggregate data, and as such provide limited insights about the effects of trade pacts to individual economic agents in the free trade area. In this study a three-digit disaggre g a t e d c o m m o d i t y / i n d u s t r y data grouped under the Standard International Tr a d e Classification is used to empirically assess the economic benefits of the Nort h American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Import demand elasticities from a dynamic demand … Show more

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Cited by 21 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…She finds that the agreement had substantial trade creation effects, with little evidence of diversion. Wylie and Wylie (1996) and Karemera and Ojah (1998) find similar results for NAFTA. 8 Brown's perspective contradicts Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) who argue that the same conditions -high trade shares with the USA and high tariffs -mean Mexico loses from NAFTA because of trade diversion and the loss of tariff revenue (p. 18).…”
Section: Empirical Evidencesupporting
confidence: 52%
“…She finds that the agreement had substantial trade creation effects, with little evidence of diversion. Wylie and Wylie (1996) and Karemera and Ojah (1998) find similar results for NAFTA. 8 Brown's perspective contradicts Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) who argue that the same conditions -high trade shares with the USA and high tariffs -mean Mexico loses from NAFTA because of trade diversion and the loss of tariff revenue (p. 18).…”
Section: Empirical Evidencesupporting
confidence: 52%
“…Eliminating nontariff barriers, for instance, cannot reduce welfare through trade diversion because a nontariff barrier does not generate revenue for the government. The approach I take is similar to that of Karemera and Ojah (1998), who estimate import demand elasticities at the industry level and then use those elasticities to calculate the effects on trade of the removal of tariff barriers under the NAFTA. 8 If the importing country is small and the world market is fully integrated, then XS row will be horizontal at the world price (the export supply elasticity faced by the importer would be infinite).…”
Section: Which Countries Would Make the Ideal Rta Trading Partners?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See also Karemara and Ojah (1998) States to Mexico especially and to Canada for motor vehicles, television sets, and textiles and apparel.…”
Section: Nafta In Context and A Review Of The Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%