An incentive compatible profit allocation mechanism for renewable energy aggregation

Zhao, Yue; Khazaei, Hossein

doi:10.1109/pesgm.2016.7741403

Cited by 14 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Moreover, the proposed PAM, as proved, is also in the core in the ex-post sense. ‚ As shown in Table I, the total payoff of the WPPs with the proposed PAM is slightly p0.72%q lower than that with the "ex-ante" PAM [17]. The reason is the following.…”

Section: B Simulation and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Ex-post stable and fair payoff allocation for renewable energy aggregation

Khazaei

Zhao

2017

2017 IEEE Power &Amp; Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT)

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Aggregating statistically diverse renewable power producers (RPPs) is an effective way to reduce the uncertainty of the RPPs. The key question in aggregation of RPPs is how to allocate payoffs among the RPPs. In this paper, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) with a simple closed-form expression is proposed: It achieves stability (in the core) and fairness both in the "ex-post" sense, i.e., for all possible realizations of renewable power generation. Furthermore, this PAM can in fact be derived from the competitive equilibrium in a market. The proposed PAM is evaluated in a simulation study with ten wind power producers in the PJM interconnection.

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Section: B Simulation and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Ex-post stable and fair payoff allocation for renewable energy aggregation

Khazaei

Zhao

2017

2017 IEEE Power &Amp; Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT)

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“…Perera et al proposed a solar power sharing mechanism while avoiding the high voltage impact to grid [11]. Zhao and Khazaei designed a cooperative game to aggregate multiple renewable power plants and proved that the core supports the social welfare [12].…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Electricity Storage Sharing Mechanism for Single Peaked Time-of-Use Pricing Scheme

Wang

2019

Preprint

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Sharing economy has disrupted many industries. We foresee that electricity storage systems could be the enabler for sharing economy in electricity sector, though its implementation is a delicate task. Unlike in the 2tier Time-of-Use (ToU) pricing, where greedy arbitrage policy can achieve the maximal electricity bill savings, most existing ToU schemes consist of multiple tiers, which renders the arbitrage challenging. The difficulty comes from the hedging against multiple tiers and the coupling between the decisions across the day. In this work, we focus on designing the energy sharing mechanism for single peaked ToU scheme. To solve the problem, we identify that it suffices to understand the arbitrage policies for two forms of 3-tier ToU schemes. We submit that under mild conditions, the sharing mechanism yields a unique equilibrium, which supports the maximal social welfare.

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“…Most of the work assume price-taking RPPs and do not consider network congestion constraints. The key issue here boils down to payoff allocation among an aggregation of RPPs [17], [18], [19], [20]. A recent work [21] puts forward a simple payoff allocation mechanism that achieves a set of desirable properties, including achieving the maximum social welfare at the unique NE among the RPPs.…”

Section: A Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Equilibria and Efficiency of Electricity Markets with Renewable Power Producers and Congestion Constraints

Khazaei,

Sun,

Zhao

2019

Preprint

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With increasing renewable penetration in power systems, a prominent challenge in the efficient and reliable power system operation is handling the uncertainties inherent in the renewable generation. In this paper, we propose a simple two-settlement market mechanism in which renewable power producers (RPPs) participate so that a) the independent system operator (ISO) does not need to consider the uncertainties of the renewables in its economic dispatch, and yet b) the market equilibrium is shown to approach social efficiency as if the ISO solves a stochastic optimization problem taking into account all the uncertainties. In showing this result, a key innovation is a new approach of efficiently computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) among the strategic RPPs in congestion-constrained power networks. In particular, the proposed approach decouples finding an NE into searching over congestion patterns and computing an NE candidate assuming a congestion pattern. As such, the computational complexity of finding an NE grows only polynomially with the number of RPPs in the market. We demonstrate our results in the IEEE 14-bus system and show that the NE approaches social efficiency as the number of RPPs grows.

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An incentive compatible profit allocation mechanism for renewable energy aggregation

Cited by 14 publications

References 14 publications

Ex-post stable and fair payoff allocation for renewable energy aggregation

Ex-post stable and fair payoff allocation for renewable energy aggregation

Optimal Electricity Storage Sharing Mechanism for Single Peaked Time-of-Use Pricing Scheme

On the Equilibria and Efficiency of Electricity Markets with Renewable Power Producers and Congestion Constraints

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