An Improved Shapley Value Method for a Green Supply Chain Income Distribution Mechanism

Xu, Zhongwen; Peng, Zixuan; Lin, Yang; Chen, Xudong

doi:10.3390/ijerph15091976

Cited by 29 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…The most important considerations that should be applied to modify the Shapley value in supply chain are the players' risk, contribution and input to the supply chain coalition (Xu et al, 2014;. Gao and Shi (2010) and Xu et al (2018) stated that the Shapley value assumes that the players in a coalition have identical risks and must face different risk occurrences and severities to gain profit and provide contribution to the coalition. On the contrary, value added also has high contribution that reflects supply chain stakeholders' performance.…”

Section: Cooperative Game Theory: the Shapley Value And Its Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Fair Profit Allocation Based on Risk and Value Added for Sugarcane Agro-industry

Asrol

Marimin

Machfud

et al. 2020

OSCM: An Int. Journal

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Profit allocation is the main critical problem in the supply chain. In agro-industry supply chain, establishing a fair and reasonable profit allocation has been more challenging due to the influence of uncertain factors. Cooperative game theory with the Shapley value has an opportunity to solve this problem given its appropriateness for the key goals of the supply chain. Fuzzy Shapley value was developed to accommodate uncertain stakeholders' payoff. In addition, uncertain risk and value added were considered for a reasonable profit allocation. This model succeeded in a case study of finding a fair profit allocation in the sugarcane agro-industry supply chain taking into account uncertain risk and value added. The model validation showed that sugarcane farmers, mills, and distributors achieved 35.38%, 30.11%, and 34.51% of profit share, respectively. Stakeholders achieved their profit share based on their marginal contribution, risk potential, and valueadded contribution, which may increase supply chain stability.

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Section: Cooperative Game Theory: the Shapley Value And Its Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Fair Profit Allocation Based on Risk and Value Added for Sugarcane Agro-industry

Asrol

Marimin

Machfud

et al. 2020

OSCM: An Int. Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Based on equations (12)- (17), we can obtain the optimal decisions of advertising investment and subsidy. When M chooses not to label, we can derive c N *…”

Section: Proposition 7 Table 5 Presents the Optimal Decisions Of Plamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, it supposes that all enterprises bear the same risk, but certain factors, such as ecological technology level and risk, will also affect profit allocation. In view of this context, Xu et al [17] took into account the environmental effort level and risk to improve the Shapley value method.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organic Food Labeling and Advertising: A Tripartite Game Model between One Supplier and Two Heterogeneous Manufacturers

et al. 2019

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The development of the organic food industry is of great significance to the environment and society as consumers increasingly prefer green and healthy food. However, certain production and investment problems must be solved. A tripartite game model is established in this study to investigate the labeling and advertising investment decisions in an organic food supply chain composed of one supplier and two heterogeneous manufacturers by the biform game approach. In addition, a subsidy mechanism is introduced to alleviate underinvestment. The results show that, first, the supplier will label if labeling cost is relatively low without considering advertising investment. Second, the supplier will not label if advertising investment is considered because of the “diffusion of responsibility” mentality, and both manufacturers will invest in advertising as a result of equilibrium in dominant strategies. Third, the advertising subsidy mechanism can achieve Pareto improvement and coordinate the supply chain. Finally, manufacturer heterogeneity will lead to differentiated subsidy strategies that the supplier can claim to give additional subsidies to the weak manufacturer, thereby weakening the “diffusion of responsibility” mentality.

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“…Using game theory, Esmaeili et al [28] constructed two extended service models under different supply chains and discussed the dominant decision-making problems of the market participants in the product market and the warranty market under a decentralized decision-making mechanism of supply chain. Xu et al [29] considered the issue of bundled pricing of durable consumer goods with warranty services under monopoly and duopoly market structures. Based on the above literature on warranty decision making, it is found that there are few studies on the coordination of supply chain systems when strong retailers provide extended warranty services.…”

Section: Warranty Operational Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

Zhu

2019

Sustainability

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The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

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An Improved Shapley Value Method for a Green Supply Chain Income Distribution Mechanism

Cited by 29 publications

References 34 publications

Supply Chain Fair Profit Allocation Based on Risk and Value Added for Sugarcane Agro-industry

Supply Chain Fair Profit Allocation Based on Risk and Value Added for Sugarcane Agro-industry

Organic Food Labeling and Advertising: A Tripartite Game Model between One Supplier and Two Heterogeneous Manufacturers

Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

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