An Identification-Based Model of Supplier-Retailer Communication

Sindhav, Birud

doi:10.1080/10466690802063978

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 59 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…At times in their interfirm relationships, distribution channel organizations may take advantage of their exchange partners by behaving guilefully. This opportunistic behavior adversely impacts channel member satisfaction (Gassenheimer et al, 1996) as well as the relational exchange norms among channel partners (Gundlach et al, 1995;Sindhav & Lusch, 2008). It also increases transaction costs (Luo, 2007), including the costs of monitoring the channel (Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999).…”

Section: The Role Of Ownership In Managing Interfirm Opportunism: a Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Ownership in Managing Interfirm Opportunism: A Dyadic Study

Brown

Krishen

Dev

2014

Journal of Marketing Channels

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We extend research on transaction cost theory that shows that vertical integration enables firms to protect their investments in exchange relationships better than market mechanisms. However, extant research finds ownership to exacerbate, rather than limit, exchange partner opportunism. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate conditions under which ownership can be effective for constraining an exchange partner's opportunism. Using matched dyadic data for 296 hotel brands, we conduct multilevel hierarchical linear modeling and identify conditions under which common ownership limits hotel opportunism. Findings indicate that ownership can limit hotel opportunism when brand headquarters can easily monitor the hotel's activities.We gratefully acknowledge support for this study from the two hotel companies studied as well as the summer research program of the Cornell University School of Hotel Administration. The able assistance of Reed Fisher in helping us with the data collection is much appreciated. We also thank George Franke for his tutelage on SAS programming. AbstractWe extend research on transaction cost theory that shows that vertical integration enables firms to protect their investments in exchange relationships better than market mechanisms. However, extant research finds ownership to exacerbate, rather than limit, exchange partner opportunism.Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate conditions under which ownership can be effective for constraining an exchange partner's opportunism. Using matched dyadic data for 296 hotel brands, we conduct multi-level hierarchical linear modeling and identify conditions under which common ownership limits hotel opportunism. Findings indicate that ownership can limit hotel opportunism when brand headquarters can easily monitor the hotel's activities.

show abstract

Section: The Role Of Ownership In Managing Interfirm Opportunism: a Dmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Ownership in Managing Interfirm Opportunism: A Dyadic Study

Brown

Krishen

Dev

2014

Journal of Marketing Channels

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Morgan and Hunt (1994) pointed out that past communication is a precursor of trust, which in turn develops better communication. The communication is directly and positively linked with building trust (Anderson and Weitz, 1989;Morgan and Hunt, 1994;Sindhav and Lusch, 2008), has strong positive effect on both trust and commitment (Palmatier et al, 2006), not very significant for building commitment (Palmatier et al, 2007). Communication fosters trust by assisting in resolving disputes and aligning perceptions and expectations (Etgar, 1979; cited by Morgan and Hunt, 1994) and hence communication was primarily related to trust in dyadic business exchange (Andeson and Weitz, 1989).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(e.g. Palmatier et al, 2006;Palmatier et al, 2007;Zaheer et al, 1998;Anderson andNarus, 1984, 1990;Dwyer et al, 1987;Morgan and Hunt, 1994;Lewin, 2009;Hennig-Thurau et al, 2002;Kumar et al, 1992;Moorman et al, 1993;Sindhav and Lusch, 2008). The relationship between trust and commitment is strong and positive (e.g.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sheng et al (2005) suggested that instrumental and social communications play different roles in mediating the effect of bureaucratic structure on boundary interpersonal trust. Sindhav and Lusch (2008) pointed out that role of communication and coordination has important role in B2B relationship due to more number of firms are becoming the integral part of vertical marketing system. They suggested that coordination in the B2B context could be generated directly by taking collaborative communication strategies.…”

Section: Amentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Key Drivers for the Development and Maintenance of Business-to-Business (B2b) Relationship: A Review

Chowdhury

2022

Khulna Univ. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Marketing literature suggests that developing and maintaining business-to-business (B2B) relationship is very much important to gain sustainable competitive advantage; however literature detailing with key drivers of developing B2B relationship is scarce. This study thus endeavours to fill the gap by integrating the concept of key drivers for B2B relationship. Many drivers may help the development and maintenance of B2B relationship. But there are some common and key drivers that play the major role in the development and maintenance of their relationship. The study indicates that key drivers of B2B relationship are trust and commitment, communication, dependence, IT and market/customer orientation, customer satisfaction, opportunism. The study suggests marketing practitioners some guidelines to develop long-lasting relationship with their business customers who can be used as a differentiator.

show abstract

“…They demonstrate that if a communication strategy matches the channel conditions (structure, climate, and power), channel outcomes (coordination, satisfaction, commitment, and performance) will be enhanced in comparison with the outcomes when a communication strategy mismatches channel conditions. In channel conditions of interdependence and mutually supportive and trusting climates, channel communications are marked by higher frequency, bidirectional flows, a more informal mode (personalized communication), and indirect contents (Mohr and Sohi S. Ranfagni and S. Guercini 302 1995;Sindhav and Lush 2008). There emerges a channel in which the communication among members is less mediated.…”

Section: Channel Conflictmentioning

confidence: 96%

Guanxi and distribution in China: the case of Ferrero Group

Ranfagni

Guercini

2013

The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer R

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper aims to analyze how guanxi-based business relations impact on distribution choices of foreign companies entering China. In particular, it investigates the influence of guanxi on decisions regarding both the organization of distribution channels and the management of distribution channels. It emerges that from an organizational point of view guanxi-based business relations may favor interdependence, low integration in the channel relationships, and foster multichannel choices. From a management point of view, guanxi may reduce the control of local partners over channel, create coexistence between conflict and collaboration in the channels relationships, and favor unmediated communication. The authors examine the emblematic case of Ferrero, a well-known Italian multinational company, specialized in chocolate production, which began to develop its entry strategy in China more than 30 years ago.

show abstract

An Identification-Based Model of Supplier-Retailer Communication

Cited by 5 publications

References 59 publications

The Role of Ownership in Managing Interfirm Opportunism: A Dyadic Study

The Role of Ownership in Managing Interfirm Opportunism: A Dyadic Study

Key Drivers for the Development and Maintenance of Business-to-Business (B2b) Relationship: A Review

Guanxi and distribution in China: the case of Ferrero Group

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About