2013
DOI: 10.1002/mde.2581
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An Extended Transaction Cost Model of Decision Rights Allocation in Franchising: The Moderating Role of Trust

Abstract: This study develops and tests an extended transaction cost model to explain the structure of decision rights in franchising. Results show that the inclusion of trust in the transaction cost model supplements the transaction cost explanation of the allocation of decision rights in franchising. On the basis of the data from the German franchise sector, we found that environmental uncertainty has a negative effect on the allocation of decision rights to franchisees because the franchisor exercises more control ov… Show more

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Cited by 26 publications
(32 citation statements)
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“…In essence, such cooperation secures resource availability to both partners, which is essential in the quest for competitive advantage and economic rents (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000;Combs & Ketchen, 1999;Crook, Ketchen, Combs, & Todd, 2008;Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006). Throughout the franchising literature, the franchisor's relationship with its franchisees has frequently proven decisive to explain the economic success or failure of the partnership (Cochet, Dormann, & Ehrmann, 2008;Evanschitzky, Caemmerer, & Backhaus, 2016;Herz, Hutzinger, Seferagic, & Windsperger, 2016;Mumdziev & Windsperger, 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In essence, such cooperation secures resource availability to both partners, which is essential in the quest for competitive advantage and economic rents (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000;Combs & Ketchen, 1999;Crook, Ketchen, Combs, & Todd, 2008;Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006). Throughout the franchising literature, the franchisor's relationship with its franchisees has frequently proven decisive to explain the economic success or failure of the partnership (Cochet, Dormann, & Ehrmann, 2008;Evanschitzky, Caemmerer, & Backhaus, 2016;Herz, Hutzinger, Seferagic, & Windsperger, 2016;Mumdziev & Windsperger, 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Theoretical models that integrate drivers from different perspectives on inter-organizational relationships provide a more holistic understanding of relationship efficacy (Mumdziev & Windsperger, 2013;Palmatier, Dant, & Grewal, 2007). Accordingly, the framework ( Fig.…”
Section: Proposed Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To put it another way, an EJV will be formed when the inputs pooled by both partners in the EJV are hard to price. This transaction cost argument has been used to predict the choice of EJVs versus other organizational modes of inter-firm cooperation in various empirical settings (e.g., Chen & Hennart, 2002;Erramilli & Rao, 1993;Gomes-Casseres, 1989;Hennart, 1991;Mumdziev & Windsperger, 2013).…”
Section: Literature Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%