My best students are those who 'ask the right questions', who attend to the relevant parts of the material. I worry that Americans live in epistemic 'bubble chambers', attending to evidence only when it confirms their beliefs.Here and elsewhere, people's epistemic standing depends partly on how they direct their attention. Yet analytic epistemology has been largely silent on attention. Susanna Siegel breaks this silence in 'Selection Effects', a
AbstractCan we be responsible for our attention? Can attention be epistemically good or bad? Siegel tackles these underexplored questions in "Selection Effects", a pathbreaking chapter of The Rationality of Perception. In this chapter, Siegel develops one of the first philosophical accounts of attention norms. Her account is inferential: patterns of attention are often controlled by inferences and therefore subject to rational epistemic norms that govern any other form of inference. Although Siegel's account is explanatorily powerful, it cannot capture a core attention norm in cognitive science: one should balance between exploratory and exploitative attention. For central cases of exploratory attention such as mind-wandering, child-like, and creative thinking are non-inferential. Siegel's view classifies them as "normative freebies" that are not subject to epistemic evaluation. We're therefore left with a disjunctive conclusion: either Siegel's inferentialist theory of attention norms is incomplete or cognitive scientists are wrong about the norms that govern attention. K E Y W O R D S attention, explore/exploit, inference, perception, rationality | 85 IRVING pathbreaking chapter of The Rationality of Perception (2017). In this chapter, Siegel develops one of the first philosophical accounts of attention norms. Siegel's account is inferential: patterns of attention are often controlled by inferences and therefore subject to rational norms that govern any other form of inference.Siegel's account of attention norms rests on the minimal theory of inference she develops in The Rationality of Perception. According to this theory, inference can result in perceptual experiences (or control attention) in much the same way that it results in belief. We can therefore evaluate perceptual and doxastic inferences by the same rational norms. My piece does not critique the main themes of Siegel's book: her theory of inference and its implications for the epistemology of perception. I focus more narrowly on Siegel's account of attention norms, unpacking the theory, its explanatory virtues, and its relationship to accounts of rational attention in cognitive science.This review has four parts: part one uses an example from Siegel to introduce three challenges that any theory of attention norms must overcome. Part two shows how Siegel's inferential theory of attention norms overcomes these challenges. Part three clarifies why Siegel's account of attention norms requires her minimal theory of inference. Part four contrasts inferential attention norms with those we find in cognitive science....