An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons

Herr, Andrew; Gardner, Rod; Walker, James M.

doi:10.1006/game.1997.0541

Cited by 114 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…However, subjects can only internalize the intertemporal externalities one or two rounds at the most in advance. This result contradicts the finding from Herr et al (1997) where subjects tend to decide myopically when extracting from a dynamic resource stock but supports some of the natural experiments by Maldonado and Moreno-Sanchez (2007) where subjects can internalize some stock dynamics. When subjects are allowed to communicate and given a calculator that forecasts potential earning in future rounds, they seem to be able to formulate strategies as a group that internalize some of the intertemporal and intratemporal externality.…”

Section: Labor Allocation and Voting Behaviorcontrasting

confidence: 56%

Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade

Galinato

2011

Ecological Economics

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This article analyzes the impact of trade on resource stocks through endogenously selected property rights regimes. A two-sector general equilibrium model is developed where opening to trade affects a common property resource stock through a community's voting decision to institute a property rights regime. The model finds that welfare can be maximized when a community degrades its resource stock under optimally selected property rights regimes after opening to trade. Results from a laboratory experiment show that subjects choose labor allocations, property rights regimes and resource stock levels that follow a Markov Perfect equilibrium path. However, subjects are only able to plan choices in three period intervals at most.1

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Section: Labor Allocation and Voting Behaviorcontrasting

confidence: 56%

Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade

Galinato

2011

Ecological Economics

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“…Such aspects make cooperation and coordination more difficult. This is demonstrated experimentally by, for example, Herr et al (1997) who introduce path-dependency and resource scarcity in a CPR experiment, which trigger a race-to-the bottom. In their study, however, there is no feedback on the current resource state.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Potential Disasters can Turn the Tragedy into Success

Lindahl

Crépin

Schill

2016

Environ Resource Econ

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This paper presents a novel experimental design that allows testing how users of a common-pool resource respond to an endogenously driven drastic drop in the supply of the resource. We show that user groups will manage a resource more efficiently when confronted with such a non-concave resource growth function, compared to groups facing a logistic growth function. Even among cooperative groups there is a significant behavioral difference, although theory predicts there should not be. We argue that effectiveness of communication is endogenous to the problem; the threat of reaching a critical tipping point, beyond which the growth rate will drop drastically, triggers more effective communication within the group, enabling stronger commitment for cooperation and more knowledge sharing, which together explains the results. We argue that the insights generated by this study can be seen as one of many, but nevertheless important, contributions towards an increased understanding of the interactions between human behavior and the environment in common-pool resource systems.

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“…Furthermore, the group appropriation and resource stock levels are quite similar, often following the same pattern, especially for group 1 and 3. This behavior may be indicative that the subject's objective is to maximize his individual payoff by 20 We use analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the Mann-Whitney to test for differences in appropriation across scenarios. The null hypothesis for both ANOVA and Mann-Whitney is that there is no difference between the groups.…”

Section: Group Appropriationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Water Allocation Strategies: Experimental Evidence from Uzbekistan

Zaikin¹,

Espínola‐Arredondo²,

Prera³

2018

JWARP

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Irrigation water is a scarce common-pool resource in Uzbekistan, which leads to an increasing competition over its allocation among farmers. We examine how the management of this resource affects individual strategic behavior and how its availability (vis-a-vis scarcity vs. non-scarcity) impacts cooperation. We conduct a field experiment in Uzbekistan where two policies are analyzed: penalty and bonus. Our findings suggest that both penalty and bonus mechanisms are effective in reducing individual water appropriation compared to the case in which these policies are absent. However, in terms of reducing overall water appropriation, the bonus mechanism is the most effective in preserving the resource stock. Therefore, policymakers should have a degree of flexibility regarding the selection of a mechanism to reduce water consumption. We also find that subjects exhibit different appropriation behaviors depending on their location within the irrigation system, with upstream users being more sensitive to water reduction than downstream users.

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An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons

Cited by 114 publications

References 7 publications

Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade

Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade

Potential Disasters can Turn the Tragedy into Success

Water Allocation Strategies: Experimental Evidence from Uzbekistan

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