An Experimental Investigation of a Third Person Enforcement in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Kusakawa, Takao; Ogawa, Kazuhito; Shichijo, Tatsuhiro

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2030602

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Community Enforcement1

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2018

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“…61 Note that, the difference in behavior is greater when the partner in round 1 and 2 is the same subject (95.52 percent against 40 percent). Hence, subjects do not rely solely 61 Kusakawa et al [2012] also provides evidence consistent with community enforcement.…”

Section: Community Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 78%

On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey

Bó

Fréchette

2018

Journal of Economic Literature

210

107

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A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature's findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it. (JEL C71, C73, D81, D83)

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Section: Community Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 78%