An experimental analysis of assignment problems and economic rent dissipation in quota managed fisheries

Emery, Timothy J.; Tisdell, John; Green, Bridget S.; Hartmann, Klaas; Gardner, Caleb; León, Rafael

doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2015.01.008

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…Ostrom (1994) ainda relaciona o processo de negociação de normas com a análise da heterogeneidade. Emery et al (2015) defende que a heterogeneidade do grupo impacta negativamente na capacidade de coordenação dos grupos, para reduzir os problemas de atribuição e a dissipação da renda econômica em um ambiente dinâmico. Quando existe heterogeneidade, as regras podem influenciar significativamente nos resultados obtidos na ação coletiva (Ostrom, 1994 Essa representatividade dos membros também pode ser realizada por associações locais, visto que estas geralmente são defendidas como possibilitadoras de maiores contatos e, consequentemente, maior capital social.…”

Section: Resultsunclassified

Confiança e redes: evidências teóricas sob o prisma do capital social

Kremer

Cavalheiro

2018

Pensamento Contemporâneo em Administração

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O objetivo deste estudo foi de identificar como os componentes do capital social têm sido aplicados a solução dos problemas de uso dos bens comuns, através da análise integrativa da produção científica internacional. Foram selecionados 39 artigos, publicados nas bases de dados Scopus, Science Direct e Web of Science. Os resultados revelam a importância da confiança, da reciprocidade, da reputação e das redes para o comportamento cooperativo. Contudo, a análise dos estudos evidenciou a necessidade de levar em consideração outros fatores, como a heterogeneidade, o tamanho dos grupos e as normas. Os estudos demonstram que a confiança pode ser construída em ambiente com homogeneidade e, nesse sentido, os grupos pequenos possuem vantagens. A homogeneidade e as normas também são importantes para a construção de redes, que permitem o compartilhamento de informações, comunicação face a face, negociação de normas compartilhadas, construção de uma reputação e construção de confiança.

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Section: Resultsunclassified

Confiança e redes: evidências teóricas sob o prisma do capital social

Kremer

Cavalheiro

2018

Pensamento Contemporâneo em Administração

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“…Usually, the themes are focused on environmental preservation and control of scarce natural resources. We can name the forestry game (Cardenas, Janssen and Bousquet, 2013; Janssen et al, 2012); the water irrigation game (Janssen et al, 2012; Cardenas, Janssen et al 2013); and the fishery game (Castillo et al, 2011;Emery et al, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation, the Crowding Out Effect and the Role Of Incentives in the Case of Sustainable Hydroplant Project in Brazil

Mussi¹,

Tortato²

2018

Manage: J. Sustainable Bus. Manage, Solutions Emerging Econ.

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Research Question: This paper sought to present a proposal for the analysis of the cooperation between a hydroelectric power plant and the fisheries community. Motivation: The use of economic experiments on the sustainability theme has been employed by adapting public goods games to the different realities faced by the players. For this research, focused on the environmental preservation, preferring to contribute/not to contribute to their preservation consists of public goods dilemmas. This subject also constitutes a research opportunity, since in the preliminary literature review few studies addressed concomitantly the sustainability question related to hydroelectric plants and the cooperation between them and a group of local stakeholders. Idea: The core idea of this paper was to bring a proposal of association between the behavioural economics and crowding out theory to the analysis of actions envisaging sustainability, which demand the cooperation between a hydroelectric power plant and the fisheries community that make a living out of its reservoir. Data: The research was conducted assessing documents such as Itaipu´s annual sustainability reports and other documents between the plant and its stakeholders, in the environmental area, and in the form of contracts and cooperation agreements. Next, eight personal interviews were conducted with managers involved in the Sustainability Programme. Tools: With these information, the suggested public goods game was adapted from Fehr and Gachter (2000), and Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007), and – for the present proposal of experiment – was named ‘reservoir game’, as the public goods in this case is Itaipu´s plant reservoir. Findings: This study can help in the acquisition of relevant information about the applicability and efficiency of punishment and reward mechanisms related to cooperation, either in support of future negotiations and agreements or in bargaining situations when groups present their demands. One can only hope to have also contributed to the improvement of management of contractual agreements between corporations and local stakeholders in projects targeting sustainability, to reduce any transaction costs, and minimize the possibilities for conflict and disagreement between partners. Contribution: This paper expands existing research related to cooperation between a power plant and its local stakeholders.

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Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point

Selles

Bonhommeau

Guillotreau

et al. 2020

Environ Resource Econ

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Complex dynamic systems such as common-pool resource systems can undergo a critical shift at a given threshold, the so-called tipping point, which potentially requires substantial changes from the management system. We present in this research a framed laboratory experiment design to examine how the threat of economic sanctions influences the strategic management of a common-pool resource. We use the context of the East Atlantic bluefin tuna international fishery as it has been the archetype of an overfished and mismanaged fishery until a dramatic reinforcement of its regulations followed the threat of a trade ban. We consider endogenous threats and examine their effects on cooperation through harvest decisions taken in the context of non-cooperative game theory in which cooperation could be sustained using a trigger strategy. Our experiment results show that the threat of economic sanctions fosters more cooperative behaviors, less over-exploitation, and a more precautionary management of resources, reducing the economic rent dissipation. This result is exacerbated when the location of the tipping point that triggers the economic sanction is uncertain. In order to avoid free-riding behaviors and foster the emergence of a self-enforcing agreement, we suggest to introduce economic sanctions, such as trade restrictions, associated with uncertain biological limit reference points.

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An experimental analysis of assignment problems and economic rent dissipation in quota managed fisheries

Cited by 6 publications

References 62 publications

Confiança e redes: evidências teóricas sob o prisma do capital social

Confiança e redes: evidências teóricas sob o prisma do capital social

Cooperation, the Crowding Out Effect and the Role Of Incentives in the Case of Sustainable Hydroplant Project in Brazil

Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point

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