An examination of the structure of governance in California school districts before and after Proposition 13

Abstract

This paper explores the structure of governance in California school districts. Two alternative models are considered, the decisive voter (benevolent dictator) model and a model that allows for rent-seeking behavior on the part of district decision makers. A formal test between these two models is proposed and implemented. The decisive voter model is found wanting as an explanation of school district decision making both before and after the passage of Proposition 13. There is, however, some evidence that the constraints imposed on some districts by Proposition 13 have forced decision makers to act in a manner more consistent with the preferences of their constituents.

Spending, school structure, and public education quality. Evidence from California

“…Coupled with Niskanen's (1971) theory of bureaucracy whereby mon opoly governments maximize functions other than pro fits, higher funding is not necessarily a sign of higherquality education. Downes (1996) finds evidence that California school districts had monopoly power before and after Proposition 13, although somewhat less after Proposition 13. Evidence of monopoly behavior was that administrators substituted improved student performance for greater numbers of administrative staff.…”

The effects of tax and expenditure limits on state fiscal reserves

“…The second is a case-study approach using a variation on the with-and-without quasi-experimental design to examine fiscal policy in a state pre- and post-imposition of the particular TEL (Dye et al., 2005, 2006; Fisher and Gade, 1991; Maher et al, 2011; Skidmore et al, 2010; Springer et al., 2009). Within the case-study approach literature, the two TELs that have been examined the most are Massachusetts's Proposition 2½ (e.g., Bradbury et al., 2001; Cutler et al., 1999; Lang and Jain, 2004) and California's Proposition 13 (e.g., Downes, 1996; Wasi and White, 2005).…”

Bureaucracy and student performance in US public schools

“…But, the positive marginal in¯ uence of another dollar spent on teachers or other inputs exceeds that of adminis trators under this weaker version as would be evidenced by diOE erences in estimated coe� cients (divided by their sal aries) in regression equations. Brewer (1996) ® nds little In a study of public schools in California, Downes (1996) ® nds evidence that school districts had monopoly power before and after Proposition 13, though somewhat less so after Proposition 13. Evidence of bureaucratic behaviour was that administrators substituted improved student performance for greater numbers of administrative staOE .…”