An evolving policy network in action: The case of construction aggregate policy in Ontario

Abstract

The history of legislation to control aggregate mining reflects a power struggle between provincial and municipal interests. A content analysis of 140 Ontario Municipal Board (omb) hearings was assessed for a twenty‐five‐year period to evaluate the conflict between provincial and municipal governments and to document the role of legislation and policy in the resolution of the disputes. This article discusses the trend of successive Ontario governments to move the municipalities out of the core of the policy network dedicated to aggregate extraction. This is a result of the province's need to assure its greater autonomy in the industry in order to guarantee adequate stocks for future development. The province's autonomy allows a greater consideration to the industry and somewhat less consideration to the environmental impacts of aggregate mining. The article shows that there has been an evolution in the policy network from a “captured network” to a more “pluralist network.” Pushing the municipalities to the periphery through strong legislation has allowed the province to undermine the strength of the municipality to protect local interests primarily concerned with reducing the amount and impact of mining taking place near residential developments. Sommaire: L'histoire de l'élaboration de lois dans le but de contrôler l'extraction d'agrégats reflète une lutte de pouvoir entre les intérêts provinciaux et municipaux. Une analyse de 140 audiences de la Commission des affaires municipales de I'Ontario (camo) couvrant plus de vingt‐cinq ans a été réalisée afin d'évaluer le con‐flit survenu entre les gouvemements provincial et municipaux et de documenter le rô1e des lois et des politiques dans la résolution de conflits. Le présent article examine comment les gouvemements qui se sont succédés en Ontario ont eu tendance àéloigner les municipalités du ceur du réseau de politiques en matière d'extraction d'agrégats. Cela vient du fait que la province doive faire preuve d'une plus grande autonomie à 1'égard du rô1e de I'industrie afin que la province puisse garantir la disponibilité de stocks adéquats pour la mise en valeur future. L'autonomie de la province a permis d'accorder un plus grand rô1e à l'industrie et quelque peu moins d'importance aux incidences environnementales de l'exploitation des agrégats. Toutefois, l'article montre qu'il y a eu me évolution dans le réseau des responsables de politiques, celui‐ci étant passé d'un réseau de la capture à un réseau plus pluraliste. En repoussant les municipalités à la périphérie par le biais de lois puis‐santes, la province a pu réduire leur capacité de protéger les intérêts locaux qui visent principalement à réduire l'importance et l'incidence dc I'cxploitation minière a proximité des lotissements résidentiels.

Ontario's planning appeal system and the outcome for downtown planning in Toronto

“…In a later case that was appealed (599 Yonge Street), a condition for being ready to support the proposal was that the developer withdraw their appeal of OPA 183; meanwhile. Earlier studies found that decision-making factors by the Tribunal do not match the planning principles or policies at stake (Chipman, 2002;Douglas et al, 2008;Kumar, 2005;Phipps, 1999;Stadel et al, 1995). This MRP adds to this, finding that City decision-making factors also seem to take this approach.…”

“…Chipman (2002, aggregating data from 870 appeal cases province-wide at an earlier time period (1971-1978, 1987-1994, and 1995-2000), finds that municipal support or opposition of a proposal had an increasing influence on the OMB's approval or rejection over time, contrasting studies focused on later time periods. A few other studies examine OMB decisions on matters other than downtown development, such as the protection of wetlands (Stadel et al, 1995), big box retail (Webber & Hernandez, 2016), aggregate mining (Douglas et al, 2008), land-use changes in Windsor (Phipps, 1999), and the completion of the Spadina Expressway (Milligan, 2011).…”

“…Most research on appeal decisions finds that the OMB increasingly favours developers or corporations over the local government or community (Douglas et al, 2008;Fernandes, 2009;Moore, 2009b;Webber & Hernandez, 2016) and that the OMB has increasingly overturned municipal decisions (Douglas et al, 2008;Fernandes, 2009;Milligan, 2011;Moore, 2009b). Studies conclude that the process seems to put constraints on the decision-making power of municipalities (Douglas et al, 2008;Fernandes, 2009;Moore, 2009b;Webber & Hernandes, 2016). Some research comments on the numbers of appeals resulting in settlement, finding an increasing trend in settlements (Moore, 2013) or noting that half of appeals were resolved by settlement at the pre-hearing stage (Webber & Hernandez, 2016).…”

“…Other common findings include that there is a lack of pertinent information at Tribunal hearings (Kumar, 2005;Phipps, 1999;Stadel et al, 1995), that private property rights have had more influence over OMB decisions than the principle of the public interest (Fernandes, 2009;Kumar, 2005;Moore, 2009b;Stadel et al, 1995), and that decisions are either inconsistent (Chipman, 2002;Kumar, 2005) or the decisionmaking factors do not match the planning principles or policies at stake (Chipman, 2002;Douglas et al, 2008;Kumar, 2005;Phipps, 1999;Stadel et al, 1995). Studies conclude that the appeal system does not always result in the best urban design outcome (Kumar, 2005) or planning outcome for the public good (Fernandes, 2009;Stadel et al, 1995).…”

Winning back more than words? Power, discourse and quarrying on the Niagara Escarpment

“…The latter states that as 'much of the mineral aggregate resources as is realistically possible will be made available to supply mineral resources needs, as close to markets as possible' (OPPS 1997). Local planners are guided by forecasts of aggregate demand and growth to find sites that facilitate the extraction of required amounts of minerals (Baker et al 2001). The aggregate actor network is composed of the aggregate industry, road builders, home developers and consulting firms and the provincial government.…”