An evolutionary game theoretic model for analyzing retailers’ behavior when introducing economy and premium private labels

Assarzadegan, Parisa; Hejazi, Seyed Reza; Raissi, Gholam Ali

doi:10.1016/j.jretconser.2020.102227

Cited by 23 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Maynard Smith and Price explained the limited conflict between animals with game theory and evolutionary game theory in order to open up a new field. Assarzadegan et al [1] explored for the first time a supply chain consisting of one National Brand (NB) manufacturer and a population of retailers under two scenarios. In the first, each retailer sells NB and chooses either to introduce an Economy Private Label or not.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…High-tech enterprises seek to maximize their own benefits, and their behavioral goal is to engage in scientific and technological innovation activities or not [10]. e government pursues the maximum social benefits, and their behavioral options include adopting strong incentives and supervision or weak incentives and supervision [1]. [10] Taxation policy Developed Significant Qualitative analysis Jia and Ma [19] Tax incentive R&D expenditures Insignificant Qualitative analysis Qi et al [11] Tax incentive Innovation capability Significant Panel regression analysis Chen and Li [13] Tax incentive R&D incentives Significant Quantitative empirical analysis Song et al [16] Tax incentive Innovation performance Insignificant Quantitative empirical analysis Chen et al [14] Taxation policy R&D efficiency Significant Quantitative empirical analysis Kläser et al [12] Taxation policy Developed Significant Quantitative empirical analysis Chen and Gupta [17] Taxation policy R&D incentives Insignificant Panel regression analysis Liu et al [27] Government regulation Developed Significant Evolutionary game Zhu G. et al [29] Environmental supervision Developed Significant Evolutionary game Álvarez et al [15] Public subsidies R&D investment Significant Quantitative empirical analysis is model…”

Section: Notations and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Innovation Behavior of High-Tech Enterprises with Government Participation

Gong

Liu

Chang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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High-tech enterprises, as the key subjects that can stimulate innovation vitality and promote innovation-driven development strategies in China, require government guidance for their innovative activities. However, the existing research has not answered the issue of how the government behavior activates the innovation ability of high-tech enterprises and what is the internal mechanism. As such, this paper takes government participation in high-tech enterprises as its research object, constructs an evolutionary game model of government participation in enterprise innovation, analyzes the internal mechanism of improvements to high-tech enterprises’ innovation ability under government tax and fee policy incentives and regulatory measures, and uses MATLAB numerical simulation to verify the results. The research shows that (1) increasing the general corporate income tax rate and reducing the high-tech corporate income tax rate can promote the transformation of general enterprises into high-tech enterprises and encourage enterprises to engage in scientific and technological innovation activities. However, when the high-tech corporate income tax rate is lower than 0.1, the marginal effect will be reduced. (2) Increasing the deduction coefficient and amortization coefficient can make high-tech enterprises more motivated to participate in innovation activities and thus render enterprise innovation more lucrative. (3) Increasing administrative penalties from regulatory authorities can promote the development of innovative activities in high-tech enterprises, but their intensity must be controlled within a reasonable range. The presented results have reference value for the adjustment of tax and fee policies among high-tech enterprises.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notations and Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Innovation Behavior of High-Tech Enterprises with Government Participation

Gong

Liu

Chang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…Supermarkets target to further increase the share of private label products in each product group due to the high profitability it provides (Assarzadegan et al, 2020). Therefore, supermarkets tend to offer private label product alternatives to customers in terms of price-quality tier rather than offering only economic ones within each product group (Nenycz-Thiel & Romaniuk, 2012, 2016.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, supermarkets tend to offer private label product alternatives to customers in terms of price-quality tier rather than offering only economic ones within each product group (Nenycz-Thiel & Romaniuk, 2012, 2016. Private label products are divided into three groups, which are economical, standard, and premium in terms of the price-quality tier (Assarzadegan et al, 2020;Geyskens, Gielens, & Gijsbrechts, 2010;Kumar & Steenkamp, 2007;Rubio, Villaseñor, & Yagüe, 2019). Premium PLs are considered one of the hottest trends in grocery retailing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mağaza İmaj Bi̇leşenleri̇ni̇n Premi̇um Özel Markali Ürünlere İli̇şki̇n Müşteri̇leri̇n Kali̇te Algisina Ve Satin Alma Ni̇yeti̇ne Etki̇si̇

Kethüda¹

2020

PPAD

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Süpermarket zincirleri, sağladığı yüksek karlılık dolayısıyla bütün ürün kategorilerinde ulusal markalara alternatif olarak kendi özel markalı ürünlerini sunmaktadır. Özel markalı ürünlerin payını daha da artırmak isteyen süpermarket zincirleri, ekonomik olanların yanında premium özel markalı ürünleri sunmaya başlamıştır. Premium özel markalı ürünler perakendecilik alanındaki en güncel konulardan bir tanesidir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, mağaza imaj bileşenlerinin müşterilerin premium özel markalı ürünlere ilişkin kalite algısına ve satın alma niyetine etkisini ortaya koymaktır. Bu amaçla birisi her gün düşük fiyat üzerine farklılaşan ve diğeri, üstün hizmet ile farklılaşan iki süpermarket müşterilerinden kolayda örneklem yöntemi ile veriler toplanmıştır. Veriler, yapısal eşitlik modellemesi ve Bağımsız Örneklem t Testi ile analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma sonucuna göre, üstün hizmet ile farklılaşan mağazalarda premium özel markalı ürünler daha kaliteli olarak algılanmakta ve bu mağazaların müşterilerinin bu ürünleri satın alma olasılıkları daha yüksek çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca, hem üstün hizmet hem de düşük fiyat müşterilerin premium özel markalı ürünlere ilişkin kalite algısını etkilemektedir. Buna karşın, sadece üstün hizmet müşterilerin premium özel markalı ürün satın alma niyetini doğrudan etkilemektedir.

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“…Ji et al [19] employed an evolutionary game model to discuss the cooperative trends of multiple stakeholders. Wu et al [50] studied the diffusion speed of a low-carbon strategy in complicated network environment using the evolutionary game theory, and Assarzadegan et al [3] analyzed the introduction of economic and premium private labels by retailers. Barari et al [4] believed that the evolutionary game theory plays a vital role in eliminating the complete rationality of SC decision-makers and provides a methodology for SC decision-makers to repeat the game.…”

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confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game theory analysis of supply chain with fairness concerns of retailers

Shu

Ding

2023

JIMO

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<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This study focuses on evolutionary game analysis of supply chain (SC) strategies with fairness concerns. First, the equilibrium solutions under the eight combined strategies are obtained through the Stackelberg game. Subsequently, evolutionary game theory is applied to analyze the stability of these equilibrium solutions and to discuss the evolutionary stability strategy of the tripartite game. The study suggests that the effect of distributional fairness concerns on SC pricing differs from that of peer-induced fairness concerns in the short term. Implanting fairness concerns into SC pricing decisions is always detrimental to the supplier and not always beneficial to retailers. From a long-term perspective, only one evolutionarily stable equilibrium point exists. Retailers do not pay attention to the fairness of the channel profit distribution, and the supplier does not consider the fairness of retailers. The results help enterprises understand the influence of fairness preferences on pricing decisions and provide a reference for the efficient operation of SCs.</p>

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An evolutionary game theoretic model for analyzing retailers’ behavior when introducing economy and premium private labels

Cited by 23 publications

References 38 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Innovation Behavior of High-Tech Enterprises with Government Participation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Innovation Behavior of High-Tech Enterprises with Government Participation

Mağaza İmaj Bi̇leşenleri̇ni̇n Premi̇um Özel Markali Ürünlere İli̇şki̇n Müşteri̇leri̇n Kali̇te Algisina Ve Satin Alma Ni̇yeti̇ne Etki̇si̇

Evolutionary game theory analysis of supply chain with fairness concerns of retailers

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