An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to study the technological transformation of the industrial sector toward renewable electricity procurement: A case study of Iran

Jamali, Mohammad-Bagher; Rasti−Barzoki, Morteza; Khosroshahi, Hossein; Altmann, Jörn

doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2022.119083

Cited by 29 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Muros et al (2022) propose a method using Nucleolus and Shapley value to properly and reasonably allocate the benefit of electric energy substitution to power customers and encourage them to participate in electric energy substitution. Jamali et al (2022) analyse manufacturers' pricing decisions and long-term adoption behavior of technology-based (TB) and non-technology-based (NTB) electricity purchasing strategies using an evolutionary game-theoretic approach, investigating the majority's preference and applying the model to Iran's cement, steel and paper industries. Chen et al (2023) present a distributed energy trading scheme utilizing consortium blockchain and game theory, featuring a P2P trading platform for direct transactions among participants, reducing operating costs while ensuring transaction security through cryptographic techniques.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(2022) propose a method using Nucleolus and Shapley value to properly and reasonably allocate the benefit of electric energy substitution to power customers and encourage them to participate in electric energy substitution. Jamali et al . (2022) analyse manufacturers' pricing decisions and long-term adoption behavior of technology-based (TB) and non-technology-based (NTB) electricity purchasing strategies using an evolutionary game-theoretic approach, investigating the majority's preference and applying the model to Iran's cement, steel and paper industries.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The world is moving towards a sustainable future, and renewable energy is at the forefront of this transition. As more and more countries shift towards renewable energy sources, it is becoming increasingly important to establish efficient and effective transaction models for the buying and selling of renewable energy (Jamali et al ., 2022; Roth et al ., 2022).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trading excess consumption certificates on the blockchain using the cooperative game theory

Ergün

2023

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PurposeThe purpose of this study is to propose a decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme based on a certificate transaction mechanism for the transaction of excess consumption certificates (ECCs) of renewable energy. The aim is to address the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode and to promote the development of the green electricity industry.Design/methodology/approachThe proposed scheme involves calculating the quotation difference for the same type of certificate transaction based on the quotations of all users of both buyers and sellers. The transaction volume is then determined based on the order of quotation difference from large to small, and the total interests of cooperation are calculated. The nucleolus method is adopted to allocate the total interests to each member of the alliance and calculate the final transaction price. The blockchain technology is used for the transaction to achieve accurate traceability and efficient supervision, and a corresponding smart contract is designed and simulated in the Ethereum consortium chain.FindingsThe results of the simulation show the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme can overcome the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode, such as low transaction efficiency, difficulty in obtaining the optimal transaction strategy and efficient supervision. The proposed scheme can promote the development of the green electricity industry by stimulating users' demand potential for green electricity.Originality/valueThe proposed scheme is original in its use of a certificate transaction mechanism to facilitate the trading of ECCs of renewable energy. The scheme adopts a decentralized multi-party cross-trading approach that overcomes the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode. The use of the nucleolus method for the allocation of total interests to each member of the alliance is also original. Finally, the use of blockchain technology for accurate traceability and efficient supervision of the transaction is an original contribution to the field.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trading excess consumption certificates on the blockchain using the cooperative game theory

Ergün

2023

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“…Xu et al [24] built an evolutionary game model to analyze how government subsidies and carbon taxes affected the green innovation patterns choices of manufacturing enterprises, and they believed that carbon taxes were more effective. Jamali et al [25] used evolutionary games to study manufacturers' renewable energy decisions of the cement, steel, and paper industries in Iran; they found that the cement and paper industries were more sensitive to subsidy allocation. Chen and Hu [26] proved that dynamic government incentives were more conducive to stimulating low-carbon behaviour of enterprises.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Technology Innovation Behaviour for Enterprises from the Perspective of Prospect Theory

Deng

Niu

2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Boosting green technology innovation of enterprise is the key to achieving a win-win situation for both environmental performance and economic performance. However, some Chinese enterprises still have hesitations and misgivings as to whether they should adopt green technology. Considering the uncertainty of the innovation and the irrational psychological factors of decision makers, the purpose of this paper is to analyse the driving mechanisms and the long-term behaviour of enterprises green technology innovation, as well as to explore what preconditions are required for enterprises to adopt green technology innovation. The methods are prospect theory and evolutionary games. This paper first calculates the equilibrium stability and evolutionary stability strategies of the enterprise green technology innovation system and then simulates the effect of subjective gains and losses values and other psychological parameters in the prospect editing and evaluation stage. Results show that increase in subjective gain and decrease in reference points and subjective spill benefit will motivate enterprises to adopt green technology innovation in the prospect editing stage; higher risk preference and lower loss aversion will increase enterprises’ motivation for green technology innovation in the prospect evaluation stage. Besides, we find that enterprise decisions are influenced by risk perception and loss aversion rather than just the magnitude of the benefits and cost. Small- and medium-sized enterprises are more likely to turn to green technology innovation than large enterprises under the same level of risk preference and loss aversion. Finally, some suggestions are put forward for the government to encourage enterprises to adopt green technology innovation. This paper can provide a reference for theoretical and practical research on evolutionary game and prospect theory on green technology innovation of enterprises.

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“…Long et al [42] and Zheng et al [43] analyzed the supply chain decision-making model of construction and demolition waste (CDW) under diferent backgrounds using evolutionary game theory, providing a reference for the government to formulate a regulatory plan. Jamali et al [44] used the evolutionary game model to analyze the pricing decisionmaking process of the Iranian manufacturing industry and found that, with the support of the government, enterprises will change their strategies in a shorter time. Colivicchi and Iannucci [45] found that insurance may play an active role in improving pollution by building a game model between insurance companies and pollution enterprises.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the Construction of an Enterprise Emergency Management System under Government Supervision: The View of Evolutionary Game Theory

Wang

Zhou

Bai

et al. 2022

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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The establishment of an emergency management system has obvious complexity, and the establishment of an enterprise’s emergency management system is influenced by external factors such as assessment agencies and regulatory departments as well as by the internal influence of various factors within the enterprise itself, such as profits and personnel quality. In order to study the impact of different factors on the construction of emergency management systems of enterprises under the current regulatory environment and under the existing reward-penalty mechanism, this study introduces factors such as rent-seeking behavior and economic level to build an evolutionary game model composed of enterprises, third-party safety assessment agencies, and government regulators. Based on the official statistics published in China and the field evidence of enterprises, third-party agencies, and emergency management departments in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China. The evolution path of the game system and the influence of the reward-penalty mechanism, rent-seeking behavior, and economic level on the strategy evolution process of the game model were analyzed by numerical simulation. The results show that there is a mechanism of mutual promotion in the strategy evolution of the game subjects, and the strategy choice of each subject shows the following characteristics: (1) reasonable subsidies and penalties play a positive role in promoting the construction of emergency management systems by enterprises. (2) Increasing the rent-seeking costs of enterprises and the reputational impact of regulators can promote the positive evolution of enterprises’ and regulators’ strategies. (3) Reducing the cost of the establishment can help enterprises establish emergency management systems, but it will reduce the probability of strict supervision by the regulators. Therefore, the government should develop a reasonable reward-penalty mechanism to replace fixed payments to enterprises and third-party agencies with tax reductions. In addition, local governments should establish an information and consultation mechanism and make the system construction and evaluation process public.

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An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to study the technological transformation of the industrial sector toward renewable electricity procurement: A case study of Iran

Cited by 29 publications

References 44 publications

Trading excess consumption certificates on the blockchain using the cooperative game theory

Trading excess consumption certificates on the blockchain using the cooperative game theory

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Technology Innovation Behaviour for Enterprises from the Perspective of Prospect Theory

Analysis of the Construction of an Enterprise Emergency Management System under Government Supervision: The View of Evolutionary Game Theory

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