An evolutionary contractualist theory of morality

Abstract

Our goal in this paper is to use an evolutionary approach to explain the existence and design-features of human moral cognition. Our approach is based on the premise that human beings are under selection to appear as good cooperative investments. Hence they face a trade-off between maximizing the immediate gains of each social interaction, and maximizing its long-term reputational effects. In a simple 2-player model, we show that this trade-off leads individuals to maximize the generalized Nash product at evolutionary equilibrium, i.e., to behave according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. We infer from this result the theoretical proposition that morality is a domain-general calculator of this bargaining solution. We then proceed to describe the generic consequences of this approach: (i) everyone in a social interaction deserves to receive a net benefit, (ii) people ought to act in ways that would maximize social welfare if everyone was acting in the same way, (iii) all domains of social behavior can be moralized, (iv) moral duties can seem both principled and non-contractual, and (v) morality shall depend on the context. Next, we apply the approach to some of the main areas of social life and show that it allows to explain, with a single logic, the entire set of what are generally considered to be different moral domains. Lastly, we discuss the relationship between this account of morality and other evolutionary accounts of morality and cooperation.

Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality

“…The second puzzle of puritanical morality concerns its relation to cooperation. Most evolutionary theories of morality share the ultimate hypothesis that moral cognition is an adaptation to the challenges of cooperation recurrent in human social life (Alexander, 1987;André et al, 2022;Baumard et al, 2013;Boehm, 2012;Curry, 2016;Haidt, 2012;Stanford, 2018;Tomasello, 2019). This hypothesis explains the vast majority of moral intuitions and norms found across human societies, such as condemnations of theft, murder, violence, unfairness, and the promotion of justice, loyalty, reciprocity, or respect for property and authority (Baumard, 2016;Boehm, 2012;Hofmann et al, 2014;Purzycki et al, 2018).…”

“…In particular, the Theory of Dyadic Morality maintains that all moral judgements stem from perceptions of dyadic harm-i.e., from perceptions that an 'agent' intentionally causes suffering to a 'patient' (Gray et al, 2012(Gray et al, , 2014Schein & Gray, 2015. Other unitary theories argue that all moral judgements are outputs of fairness computations, tracking violations of mutual benefit between cooperative partners (André et al, 2022;Baumard, 2016;Fitouchi et al, 2021b) 2 . By contrast, theories based on distinct cognitive domains-such as Moral Foundations Theory-maintain that moral cognition is composed of multiple, functionally distinct, domain-specific mechanisms, some of which track stimuli unrelated to harm or fairness (Graham et al, 2013).…”

Cooperative Evolutionary Pressure and Diminishing Returns Might Explain the Fermi Paradox: On What Super-AIs Are Like

“…section 2.2.1). 10 The galaxy colonization algorithm has been implemented, and tested under conditions intended to be Milky Way like. 11 The tests indicate that the colonization plans are good.…”

“…André and Baumard have modeled how fairness evolves. [2] Here we will attempt something similar 10 An other way to see the absurdity of actual exponential colonization (or reproduction) is to note that it would lead to P = NP, i.e. a polynomial time algorithm for solving e.g.…”

Punitive justice serves to restore reciprocal cooperation in three small-scale societies

“…Our model draws on previous psychological and anthropological insights. Evolutionary moral psychologists have argued that retributive justice intuitions function to restore a balance of interests between offender and victim (André et al, 2022;Baumard, 2010Baumard, , 2016Fitouchi et al, 2021; see also Sznycer et al, 2021), while observers of small-scale law have noted that disputants often prioritize reparation and peace-making (Diamond, 2013;Hoebel, 2009;Wiessner & Pupu, 2012). We here integrate these insights, using the psychology of justice to explain the design and cultural evolution of institutionalized punishment in small-scale societies.…”