An evolutionary bargaining‐based approach for incentivized cooperation in opportunistic networks

Abstract

Opportunistic networking enables users to communicate in an environment where connectivity is intermittent or unstable. However, such networking scheme assumes that mobile nodes voluntary cooperate, which cannot be guaranteed. Some nodes can simply exhibit selfish behavior and thus diminish the effectiveness of the approach. In this paper, a game scenario is formulated in which the nodes try to convince each other to participate in packets forwarding. Each node is considered as a player in this game. When a node comes in the communication range of another, a bargaining game starts between them as part of the message forwarding process. Both players try to have a mutual agreement on a price for message forwarding. We present a new incentive mechanism called evolutionary bargaining-based incentive scheme (EBIS) to motivate selfish nodes to cooperate in data forwarding. In EBIS, a node negotiates with other nodes to obtain an agreeable amount of credit for its forwarding service. Nodes apply a sequential bargaining game and then adapt their strategies using an evolutionary model to maximize the probability of reaching an agreement. Unlike classical bargaining games, nodes in our model are boundedly rational. In addition, we use the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) concept to determine the adaptive strategies for the nodes. The comparison of EBIS with a benchmarked model demonstrates that EBIS performs better in terms of packet delivery ratio and average latency. K E Y W O R D Salternating-offers bargaining game, bounded rationality, evolutionary game theory, opportunistic networks

Toward Secure and Trustworthy Vehicular Fog Computing: A Survey

“…Furthermore, authors in [125] have considered three types of attacks, namely Sybil attacks, tampering message attacks, and packet loss profits attacks [126], [127], and three aspects of privacy, namely data, social at-tributes, and transaction privacy. Indeed, the authors presented an incentive-based data forwarding technique to increase message transmission efficiency in IoV while protecting vehicle users' private information.…”

Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

“…In such a case, nodes are compensated for their contribution in offering services to other nodes. However, having said that, the node in which requests the help of other nodes in forwarding packets, will utilize the same payment method in order to pay for these services (Nazih, Benamar, & Younis, 2020;Ojha, Jackowski, Snášel, & Abraham, 2014).…”