An Evolutionary Approach to Norms

Abstract

Norms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups, even when there are more than two people and no central authority. This paper investigates the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality. The dynamics of this new norms game are analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strategies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies. The results show the conditions under which norms can evolve and prove stable. One interesting possibility is the employment of metanorms, the willingness to punish someone who did not enforce a norm. Many historical examples of domestic and international norms are used to illustrate the wide variety of mechanisms that can support norms, including metanorms, dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership in groups, law, and reputation.

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

“…6. The process outlined here parallels results obtained by Axelrod (1986) in a simulation of the evolution of group norms. Although Axelrod did not assign special weight to the initial defections from norms, his model assumes that successful disobedience will lead to a proliferation of violations.…”

“…Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite.…”

“…When it goes into effect, the logic of collective action is presumably suspended, and the mismatch between individual and collective interests is overcome by force (Olson 1965: 133-134). Coercion, however, is a notoriously ineffective means for achieving compliance -so unreliable that it can usually succeed only if supplemented by habitual obedience and substantial voluntary cooperation (Axelrod 1986, Hoekema 1986. Instead of allowing government to escape the uncertainties of voluntary collective action, coercion is only a continuation of collective action by other means.…”

The layered prisoners' dilemma: Ingroup versus macro-efficiency

“…That interation should facilitate cooperation (vis-~t-vis a one shot setting) is the standard theoretical conjecture (cf., Axelrod, 1984Axelrod, , 1986. One of Olson's points in the Rise andDecline of Nations is that, over time, ingroups can mobilize rewards, punishments, and selective incentives which induce greater amounts of cooperative behavior.…”

Mechanistic models in computational social science

“…A classic example is Axelrod's 1986 paper [60] where he investigated norms emerging as successful strategies in situations described by game theory. Axelrod let the norms evolve by genetic algorithms (an algorithmic framework for optimization inspired by genetics).…”