An evolutionary analysis of low-carbon technology investment strategies based on the manufacturer-supplier matching game under government regulations

Liu, Li; Wang, Zhe; Li, Xintao; Liu, Yingyan; Zhang, Zaisheng

doi:10.1007/s11356-021-18374-6

Cited by 17 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…The government’s limited participation in green technology innovation is the reason for this phenomenon. In fact, a high penalty for breach of contract reflects enterprises and universities/institutes preferring collaborative innovation, while the government penalty indicates that the collaborative behaviors of enterprises and universities/institutes deriving from government restrictions [ 62 ]. In the stage of pilot project promotion, it is difficult for the government to compel the above two types of innovation agents to strictly adopt a cooperation strategy when acting as a guide.…”

Section: Simulation and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Mechanism of Government–Industry–University–Institute Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology Based on Game–Based Cellular Automata

Zhou

2022

IJERPH

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In order to ensure stable cooperation among the government, enterprise and university/institute in the green technology innovation process and guide an increasing number of innovation agents in the region to adopt cooperation, this paper studies the mechanism of green technology innovation. A tripartite evolutionary game model is established and the strategy choices of the government, industry and university/institute are analyzed through mathematical derivation. On this basis, the cellular automata theory is used to explore strategy choices of all innovation agents in the region from the perspective of a spatial game. From the numerical tests, the following results are obtained: increasing the cooperative innovation revenue, fairness of this revenue distribution or penalties for breach of contract can consolidate the cooperative relationship among the government, enterprise and university/institute, achieving the goal of guiding all innovation agents in the region to accept the collaborative innovation mode; regulating the government subsidy or government penalty can consolidate the cooperative relationship among participants in the pilot project, but cannot guide all innovation agents in the region accept the collaboration innovation mode. This paper’s results not only enrich the theory of government–industry–university–institute collaborative innovation in green technology, but provide ideas for stable cooperation mechanisms and comprehensive promotion of this collaborative innovation mode as well.

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Section: Simulation and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Mechanism of Government–Industry–University–Institute Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology Based on Game–Based Cellular Automata

Zhou

2022

IJERPH

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“…GTI is usually a long-term and continued dynamic process, and evolutionary analysis can offer a feasible theoretical framework for solving the dilemma of dynamic innovation decision-making of enterprises (Liu, Wang, Li, et al, 2022;Wang et al, 2014). The evolutionary game theory originated from biological evolution theory and was first proposed by ecologists (Taylor & Jonker, 1978).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The system subject structure considered in this paper is richer and closer to reality. and Liu, Wang, Li, et al (2022) incorporate the time element into their research and investigate the selection of multi-stage GTI in a supply chain, while our paper focuses on analyzing the interactions of multiple participants in a competitive setting. In summary, the above studies have verified the environmental protection effect of GTI from the micro perspective, but there is little literature that has considered multi-participant interactions regarding GTI.…”

Section: Researches On Gtimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When an enterprise does not innovate green technology, there is no funding gap, that is, G ¼ 0, no loan transaction or green production. Due to the time stickiness of GTI, innovation outcomes do not take effect immediately (Liu, Wang, Li, et al, 2022), so enterprises may be opportunistic and collude with financial institutions to pretend to innovate green technologies. Under such conditions, enterprises must pay hidden costs to financial institutions f (f > F F ).…”

Section: Behavioral Strategies Of Enterprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary game analysis on behavioral strategies of four participants in green technology innovation system

et al. 2022

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To study the sustainable development of the green technology innovation system (GTIS), more and more people have begun to pay attention to the behavior evolution and strategic choice of participants. This paper develops a four‐participant evolutionary game model to study the interaction and behavior evolution of government, financial institutions, enterprises, and the public on green technology innovation (GTI), determines the payoff matrix of GTIS, derives replicator dynamic equations, calculates evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) of participants, and identifies evolution paths of ESSs through numerical simulations. The findings show that in most cases, the government prefers to adopt “weak supervision” strategies to regulate the market, and the public prefers to adopt “supervision” strategies to supervise enterprises. Encouraging enterprises to implement GTI through subsidies and funding support is a vital means in the initial stage of sustainable development. It is imperative to establish a multi‐participant collaborative governance mechanism to promote the sustained and sound GTIS development.

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“…Carbon penalties and incentives are being pushed by governments and policy makers to help meet environmental goals [91][92][93]. From the concrete producer's perspective, it is important to meet performance and sustainability requirements while maintaining a cost-efficient business.…”

Section: Proposed Multi-criteria Comparison Indicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-criteria comparison tools to evaluate cost- and eco-efficiency of ultra-high-performance concrete

Tavares,

Skillen,

Shi

et al. 2023

Environ. Res.: Infrastruct. Sustain.

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This work was motivated by the increasing need for proper metrics and tools to demonstrate the effect of mechanical performance, as a function of concrete mix composition, in dictating the dimensions of structural elements and associated costs and embodied carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Mixture compositions associated with different concrete technologies were compared using multi-criteria comparison indices derived using structural design considerations and calculated using information on compressive strength, volumetric embodied CO2 and unit costs. In addition, predicted compressive strengths obtained with machine learning (ML) models are used to calculate these indices for a domain of mix proportions associated with ultra-high-performance concrete materials to generate multi-objective density diagrams (MODDs). The makeup of this tool facilitates the evaluation of rather complicated trends associated with mix proportions and multi-objective outcomes, allowing ML-based tools to be of easy interpretation by industry personnel with no expertise in artificial intelligence. MODDs could be used as aids in the decision-making process during mix design stages and serve as proof of mixture optimization that could be introduced in Environmental Product Declarations. Results show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, high-binder content and ultra-high strength concrete technologies are not necessarily detrimental to cost and/or eco efficiencies. For the applications evaluated herein, optimum solutions were mostly obtained with these types of concrete, suggesting that industry trends toward requiring minimization of embodied carbon footprint on a per volume of concrete basis are misguided and should not be used as a standalone metric to minimize the total carbon footprint of concrete structures.

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An evolutionary analysis of low-carbon technology investment strategies based on the manufacturer-supplier matching game under government regulations

Cited by 17 publications

References 74 publications

Research on the Mechanism of Government–Industry–University–Institute Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology Based on Game–Based Cellular Automata

Research on the Mechanism of Government–Industry–University–Institute Collaborative Innovation in Green Technology Based on Game–Based Cellular Automata

Evolutionary game analysis on behavioral strategies of four participants in green technology innovation system

Multi-criteria comparison tools to evaluate cost- and eco-efficiency of ultra-high-performance concrete

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