An epistemology for practical knowledge

Abstract

Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form.

Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?)

“…An influential contemporary version of the idea that the twoin-one claim is also true for practical knowledge, is embodied in Anscombe's characterisation of this knowledge as 'the cause of what it understands' (Anscombe 2000, 87). I provide an account of practical self-knowledge which takes its mark from Anscombe's, and has much in common with the account of doxastic self-knowledge I develop below, in (Campbell 2017). 4 For more on this idea, from Boyle's perspective, see (Boyle 2009).…”

A metaphysics for practical knowledge

“…I also disagree with Özaltun's concluding remark that truth (simpliciter) is the aim of practical thinking, because this claim may mislead one into thinking that practical knowledge is a kind of judgment, although I will not pursue that matter here. Campbell (2017) argues (against Velleman 1989;Setiya 2008) that the metaphysics of practical knowledge is distinct from that of belief; it rather depends on the mental state of intention. On my interpretation, only Campbell's first claim is correct.…”

“…3. It is controversial whether practical knowledge is independent of what the agent actually does (McDowell 2013; Özaltun 2016); whether one has it whenever one acts intentionally (Davidson [1978] (Campbell 2017;Setiya 2008;Velleman 1989); etc. 4.…”

“…Campbell (2017) argues (against Velleman 1989; Setiya 2008) that the metaphysics of practical knowledge is distinct from that of belief; it rather depends on the mental state of intention. On my interpretation, only Campbell’s first claim is correct.…”

“…3.It is controversial whether practical knowledge is independent of what the agent actually does (McDowell 2013; Özaltun 2016); whether one has it whenever one acts intentionally (Davidson [1978] 2000; Setiya 2007); whether it is only of something present or could be of something past or future (Setiya 2016; Thompson 2011); whether it is knowledge of what is good as well as being knowledge of what I do (2018; Rödl 2011; Tenenbaum 2009); whether it is the cause of what it understands (Paul 2011; Schwenkler 2015; Setiya 2016); how it is related to observational or inferential knowledge of what one is doing or what is happening (McDowell 2013; Moran 2004; Schwenkler 2015); how it is related to other forms of self-knowledge , such as knowledge of one’s bodily movements and position (McDowell 2011; Moran 2004); how it is related to know how (Rödl 2011; Setiya 2016); how it is related to belief (Campbell 2017; Setiya 2008; Velleman 1989); etc.…”