An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Participation in Crop Insurance

Just, Richard E.; Calvin, Linda

doi:10.1007/978-94-011-1386-1_8

Cited by 24 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…One explanation is that an older farm operator may have more wealth and less debt providing greater potential to selfinsure. This is consistent with some of the technology adoption literature (El-Osta and Morehart, 1999;Lin, 1991; and others) and insurance literature (Mishra and Goodwin, 2003;Smith and Baquet, 1996;Just and Calvin, 1990).…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 88%

Is moral hazard good for the environment? Revenue insurance and chemical input use

Mishra

Nimon

El‐Osta

2005

Journal of Environmental Management

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 88%

Is moral hazard good for the environment? Revenue insurance and chemical input use

Mishra

Nimon

El‐Osta

2005

Journal of Environmental Management

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“…However, the ones mentioned above pay particular attention to the factors that affect the insurance purchasing decision of farmers. The present study differs from Smith and Baquet (1996); Smith and Goodwin (1996); Calvin (1992) ;Coble, et al (1996); and Just and Calvin (1990) in two ways. First, our study investigates the factors affecting the use of revenue insurance.…”

contrasting

confidence: 71%

Revenue insurance purchase decisions of farmers

Mishra

Goodwin

2006

Applied Economics

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The objective of this study is to evaluate farm, household, and financial characteristics of cash grain farmers' decisions of whether to purchase revenue insurance. Using farm-level data these characteristics were identified by estimating a logit model of revenue insurance purchase decisions by farm operators. Results indicate that farm operators with the ability to self-insure through accumulation of sufficient wealth reserves measured in terms of the ratio of debts-to-assets, operators with off-farm income, and participation in production and marketing contracts, are more likely to pursue these strategies as a substitute for federal revenue insurance programmes. Further, study finds that older and wealthy cash grain farmers are less likely to buy revenue insurance.

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“…We believe it is clear that from a policy perspective the demand or participation elasticities produced by these studies are their most important outputs. Despite considerable variation in crops and regions examined, elasticities reported from the firm-level studies (Calvin 1992, Just and Calvin 1990, Coble et al (1996, Smith and Baquet 1996) are consistent in suggesting that crop insurance demand is inelastic. Interestingly, it appears that these elasticity estimates are fairly robust to recent significant program modifications.…”

Section: Alternative Designssupporting

confidence: 58%