An Efficient Game Form for Unicast Service Provisioning

Abstract

We consider the decentralized bandwidth/rate allocation problem in unicast service provisioning with strategic users. We present a mechanism/game form which possesses the following properties when the users' utilities are concave: (1) It implements in Nash equilibria the solution of the corresponding centralized rate allocation problem in unicast service provisioning. (2) It is individually rational. (3) It is budget-balanced at all Nash equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism/game form as well as off equilibrium. When the users' utilities are quasi-concave the mechanism possesses properties (2) and (3) stated above. Moreover, every Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the proposed mechanism results in a Walrasian equilibrium.

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

“…Nash's mass-action interpretation of NE has also been adopted in engineering publications where mechanism design ideas are used to solve decentralized resource allocation problems (see (Stoenescu & Ledyard 2006, Sharma & Teneketzis 2011, Kakhbod & Teneketzis 2012b, Kakhbod & Teneketzis 2012c, Kakhbod & Teneketzis 2012a, Sharma & Teneketzis 2012, Kash & Parkes 2010). Our interpretation of NE is similar to that of (Reichelstein & Reiter 1988), (Groves & Ledyard 1987).…”

An Efficient Game Form for Multi-Rate Multicast Service Provisioning

“…In this paper we adopt NE as an equilibrium/solution concept, and interpret it in the same way as in [19]- [21]. A philosophy similar to ours has also been adopted in [22]- [24].…”

“…So, with each group considered a single agent/singleton the multi-rate multicast service provisioning problem with strategic users becomes equivalent to the unicast service provisioning problem with strategic users. It is well known [22] that the unicast service provisioning problem with strategic users is a market problem with strategic users. At each link, the price per unit of bandwidth paid collectively by each group 3 using the link is the same.…”

“…A game form/mechanism ( [18], [22], [23]) consists of two components M, f . The component M denotes the users' message/strategy space, M defines the information the users are allowed to communicate with one another during the message exchange process.…”

Generalized proportional allocation mechanism design for multi-rate multicast service on the Internet

“…For implementation, readers may refers to survey article [1] where the discussion is in microeconomics context or one may refer to [2,3] for mechanism design review with networks and communications applications. Mechanism design for allocation of a single divisible good in Internet framework has been discussed in [4,5,6], where implementation in general unicast and multicast has been discussed in [7,8,9,10]. All of the above as well as the work here uses Nash equilibrium as a solution concept.…”