An efficient eCK secure certificateless authenticated key agreement scheme with security against public key replacement attacks

Daniel, Renu Mary; Rajsingh, Elijah Blessing; Silas, Salaja

doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2019.05.003

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Efforts have been made to resolve this problem. Since then, many CL-AKA schemes have been proposed [ 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 ]. There are two common security requirements for CL-PKC technologies.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Sun et al [ 34 ] and Simplicio Jr et al [ 35 ], because the partial key generated by KGC contains only the information of the user’s identifier and the verification tag, only the identifier can actually be checked. Later, Xie et al [ 36 ] and Daniel et al [ 37 ] solve this problem by including the information of verification public key generated by the user and the identifier in the partial key generated by KGC. However, public key replacement attacks are also possible in [ 36 ].…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, public key replacement attacks are also possible in [ 36 ]. The authors of [ 37 ] argued that there was no problem even if the partial key generated by KGC was transmitted publicly. However, if a partial key is transmitted publicly, anyone can create values that are used as input when performing hash operation on the value to be authenticated.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scheme 2 features the certificateless-based AKA introduced in 2.4; however, to bind the public key to the signature generated by the CA, the user first generates a key pair and a partial secret key in the CA. This is the scheme described previously [ 37 ]. Figure 6 shows the scenario of Scheme 2 and the system parameters of Scheme 2 are as follows.…”

Section: Proposed Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Compared with Scheme 1, which can perform authentication and key agreement quickly, it does not show efficiency in terms of speed. However, compared with the existing ECDSA or other schemes [ 29 , 30 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 ], the computation speed of Scheme 1 is reduced, and it provides safety considering masquerade attack, replay attack, and public key verifiability. Table 4 shows the comparison of Scheme 2 with the existing schemes.…”

Section: Analysis Of Proposed Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Lightweight Authentication and Key Agreement Schemes for IoT Environments

Lee

2020

Sensors

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In the Internet of Things (IoT) environment, more types of devices than ever before are connected to the internet to provide IoT services. Smart devices are becoming more intelligent and improving performance, but there are devices with little computing power and low storage capacity. Devices with limited resources will have difficulty applying existing public key cryptography systems to provide security. Therefore, communication protocols for various kinds of participating devices should be applicable in the IoT environment, and these protocols should be lightened for resources-restricted devices. Security is an essential element in the IoT environment, so for secure communication, it is necessary to perform authentication between the communication objects and to generate the session key. In this paper, we propose two kinds of lightweight authentication and key agreement schemes to enable fast and secure authentication among the objects participating in the IoT environment. The first scheme is an authentication and key agreement scheme with limited resource devices that can use the elliptic curve Qu–Vanstone (ECQV) implicit certificate to quickly agree on the session key. The second scheme is also an authentication and key agreement scheme that can be used more securely, but slower than first scheme using certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). In addition, we compare and analyze existing schemes and propose new schemes to improve security requirements that were not satisfactory.

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