An Efficient Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme Supporting Privacy-Preservation for Internet of Drones Communications

Abstract

In recent years, due to the rapid development of Internet of things (IoTs), various physical things (objects) in IoTs are smart enough to make their own decisions without the involvement of humans. The smart devices embedded in a drone can sense, collect, and transmit real-time data back to the controller from a designated environment via wireless communication technologies. The mobility, flexibility, reliability and energy efficiency of drones makes them more widely used in IoT environments such as commercial, military, entertainment applications, traffic surveillance and aerial photography. In a generalized IoD architecture, we have communications among the drones in a flying zone, among the drones and the control server, and also among the drones and authorized user. IoD still has many critical issues that need to be addressed, such as data access being carried out through a public channel and battery operated drones. To address these concerns in IoD communications, in this paper, an efficient authentication and secure communication scheme with privacy preservation is proposed and it only uses secure one-way hash function and bitwise XOR operations when control server, drone and user mutually authenticate each other. After the successful authentication, both IoD-based participants can agree on a common session key to secure the subsequent communication messages. The widely accepted ProVerif and BAN logic analysis have been used to assure that the proposed scheme is provably secure against existing well-known security attacks and ensures privacy. Finally, a comparative analysis is presented to demonstrate the proposed scheme preserves efficiency when compared to existing competitive schemes.

DAC‐MD: A privacy preserving drone‐access control scheme for last mile delivery

“…The computational cost of the comparative studies 11,[14][15][16][18][19][20][21][22][23]31,32 including proposed scheme is shown in Table 4. According to this table the computational cost of symmetric cryptography-based schemes 11,15,[18][19][20][21]23,31 and proposed scheme is depicted as .285, .628, .562, .577, .556, .532, .40, .41, and .54 ms, respectively. Similarly, the computational latency for asymmetric crypto-primitives based costly solutions [14][15][16]22,32 is computed as 49.91, 62.43, 12.69, 171.567, and .40 ms, respectively.…”

“…According to this table the computational cost of symmetric cryptography-based schemes 11,15,[18][19][20][21]23,31 and proposed scheme is depicted as .285, .628, .562, .577, .556, .532, .40, .41, and .54 ms, respectively. Similarly, the computational latency for asymmetric crypto-primitives based costly solutions [14][15][16]22,32 is computed as 49.91, 62.43, 12.69, 171.567, and .40 ms, respectively. The communication cost for the compared schemes and proposed scheme is also illustrated in Table 4.…”

“…This section evaluates the performance of the relevant solutions 11,[14][15][16][18][19][20][21][22][23]31,32 against the proposed model in terms of computational cost, communication cost, and compliance to security properties. For analyzing the computational overhead of protocols with different crypto-primitives, an experiment was performed on mobile device (drone) having 2.45G processor and 2GB RAM on Android 4.4.2 OS, while the experiment for Control Server was simulated on 2.9GHz CPU and 4GB memory, Windows 8 OS platform.…”

“…The description of computational latencies for the used primitives is given in Table 3. The computational cost of the comparative studies 11,[14][15][16][18][19][20][21][22][23]31,32 including proposed scheme is shown in Table 4. According to this table the computational cost of symmetric cryptography-based schemes 11,15,[18][19][20][21]23,31 and proposed scheme is depicted as .285, .628, .562, .577, .556, .532, .40, .41, and .54 ms, respectively.…”

“…As it can be witnessed from Table 5 that the proposed scheme is resistant to all known attacks in comparison with drone-led authentication schemes, which are, based either on symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. 11,[14][15][16][18][19][20][21][22][23]31,32 The schemes 14,16,22,32 are susceptible to stolen device attacks in the form of guessing session key, in case the device is stolen by an adversary. The computational cost of schemes 14,16,32 is not even comparable with symmetric-crypto based authentication models since these employ costly ECC, bilinear pairing and exponential operation-based primitives.…”