An efficient auction-based mechanism for hierarchically structured bandwidth markets

On auction equilibrium models with network applications

“…We now show that conditions (13)- (16) can be equivalently rewritten in the form of a VI: Find a pair (x * , y * ) ∈ W such that m∈M p∈P m (17) if and only if it satisfies conditions (13)(14)(15)(16), (6)(7)(8).…”

“…Proposition 3 (see [9]) A flow vector x * ∈ X solves VI (10) if and only if it satisfies conditions (5)(6)(7)(8)(9).…”

“…As a result, most known auction-based models applied to wireless network resource allocation problems deal just with indivisible goods; see e.g. [7,8]. At the same time, existing auction models with divisible goods in this field reduce to simple proportional decision rules; see e.g.…”

Spectrum and storage capacity management using network economics and optimization methods

“…It is explained that due to the different objectives among the 1 st -layer auctioneer (initial owner of the auctioned items) and the intermediaries, the overall resource allocation is either inefficient or untruthful. In [9], the authors study a 2-layer market for bandwidth allocation in wired networks and draw similar conclusions. Moreover, they propose a solution that is based on ascending auctions.…”

“…We summarize these different characteristics of the operators with a real-valued parameter which we call the type of the operator, [58], [19]. Notice that, our system model is general and satisfies the basic assumptions and requirements of many different settings, [32], [78], [24], [9]. Figure 3·3: System Model.…”