An Efficient and Provably-Secure Certificateless Proxy-Signcryption Scheme for Electronic Prescription System

Abstract

Electronic prescription is increasingly popular in our society, particularly in technologically advanced countries. Due to strict legal requirements and privacy regulations, authorization and data confidentiality are two important features in electronic prescription system. By combining signature and encryption functions, signcryption is an efficient cryptographic primitive that can be used to provide these two features. While signcryption is a fairly established research area, most signcryption schemes proposed recently have several limitations (e.g., high communication costs, limited bandwidth, and insecurity), and designing secure and practical signcryption schemes remains challenging. In this paper, we propose an improved certificateless proxy signcryption (CLPSC) scheme, based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). We also demonstrate that the proposed CLPSC scheme is secure in the random oracle model and evaluate its performance with related schemes. The security and performance evaluations show that the proposed CLPSC scheme can potentially be implemented on resource-constrained low-computing mobile devices in an electronic prescription system.

A Lightweight and Secured Certificate-Based Proxy Signcryption (CB-PS) Scheme for E-Prescription Systems

“…In 2018, Huifang et al [40], by using the concept of universal composability proposed identity-based PS scheme. However, the scheme can be affected by the key escrow problem and substantial pairing operations.In 2018, Li et al [2], first of all proved that the scheme of Bhatia and Verma [1] is not resist against the public key replacement attack and then present a new Certificateless PS scheme for E-prescription system. However, the scheme is affected by the need of secure link for the distribution of partial private key among the participants.…”

“…In this phase, we compare our CB-PS with the existing related schemes TBKAV [1], LXKXD [2], CYL [39], HZJX [40], and QTLG [38] on the basis of three major parameters: security, computational cost, and communication overhead. The following are illustrations of the claimed performance parameters.…”

“…In Table 6, we explain the comparisons regarding the security requirement among proposed CB-PS and TBKAV [1], LXKXD [2], CYL [39], HZJX [40], and QTLG [38]. The symbol ⩗ is used to obey the security requirement, the symbol ⤬ is used for not satisfying the security property, and the symbol ⤱ for not mentioning the security property.…”

“…Further, WUF, CON, INT, UF, FR, RRA, , and VTAT represents warrant unforgeability, confidentiality, integrity, unforgeability, forward secrecy, resists replay attack, random oracle model, and validation through the AVISPA tool, respectively. The schemes TBKAV [1], LXKXD [2], CYL [39], and HZJX [40] do not satisfy the security properties of FR, RRA, and the security requirements are proven using , which is not practical in a real scenario. The scheme QTLG [38] does not satisfy RRA property.…”

“…Later, the patient sends the medication request to the pharmacy electronically. Further, the pharmacy verifies the request, if the verification process is successfully done, then it downloads the prescription from the MDS/SPS and sends the medication to the patient [2]. Though, the transmission is done through open network (internet), in which the attacker can easily access to the message, reveal the actual contents, and injecting a new message to the network on behalf of the actual sender.…”