An Effect of Minority's self-sacrificing behavior on Others' pro-attitudinal behavior

Nonami, Hiroshi

doi:10.2130/jjesp.33.31

Cited by 1 publication

(3 citation statements)

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“…The self-sacrificing minority member should have a unique effect in promoting people's pro-environmental behavior, against the inhibiting effects of cost. These conclusions support the first hypothesis in this study, and are also consistent with Nonami (1993).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

“…Minorities are often punished in the form of prejudice and loss of tangible rewards because their alternative norm conflicts with the dominant norm (Mugny, 1982;Nonami, 1993). Since pro-environmental behavior is generally acknowledged to be desirable, sanctions against it often take the form of reducing tangible rewards or of increasing behavioral costs, rather than prejudice.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When people observe an ecological minority member acting consistently to protect the environment in spite of his/her loss of personal benefit, it is easy for them to think of such behavior as self-sacrificing. According to Nonami (1993), this self-sacrificing behavior can be defined as one form of "investment," which is one of a minority's behavioral styles as reported by Moscovici (1976). Few studies have examined "investment" experimentally, whereas the effects of other kinds of styles, such as "consistency" and "rigidity," have been researched over the last 20 years (Maass & Clark, 1984;Mugny & Peretz, 1991).…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Effects of a Self‐sacrificing Minority on Pro‐environmental Norms and Behavior: An Investigation Using a Sea Pollution Game

Nonami

1997

Jpn Psychol Res

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This research investigated how a minority member sacrificing his/her personal benefits to protect the environment might influence the attitudes and behavior of others. The experiment, using a sea pollution game, employed a 2(minority factor)×2(cost factor) factorial design. Under the high‐cost condition, in which an ecological minority bears the substantial cost it was hypothesized that the rate of subjects' pro‐environmental behavior would be higher in the one‐minority case than in the no‐minority case. In contrast, under the low‐cost condition, the differences between these two cases would decrease. The results supported this assumption. In prompting pro‐environmental behavior, a self‐sacrification minority member is more influential than one whose behavior is not self‐sacrificing. Moreover, under the one‐minority condition, path analyses indicated that the subjects' cost evaluation did not affect their behavior. It was concluded that when the subjects saw an ecological minority, the inhibiting effects of cost on their pro‐environmental behavior would decrease.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 92%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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