An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations

Tollison, Robert D.; Willett, Thomas D.

doi:10.1017/s0020818300032252

Cited by 255 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Negotiation challenges researchers and practitioners from many disciplines including anthropology (Docherty, 2003), psychology and sociology (Bazerman et al, 2007;Francis, 2008), political sciences (Zartman and Rubin, 2002;Slantchev, 2004), economics (Tollison and Willett, 2009;Kremenyuk and Sjostedt, 2000), and law ( McMains and Mullins, 2006). Another discipline which addressed negotiation is decision-making (Raia et al, 2002;Sebenius, 1992;Young, 1991) that is the main focus in this research and elaborated further in the following sub-section.…”

Section: Negotiation Basicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An agent-based model to support negotiation-based order acceptance in a multi-plant enterprise

Mobini

Behdani

Lukszo

et al. 2011

2011 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics

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SummaryOrder acceptance (OA) has a large inuence on the performance of an enterprise. On the one hand, always accepting an order when capacity is available may restrict the system to accept more protable orders in the future. On the other hand, rejecting too many orders leads to low capacity utilization and also has repercussions for future customer relations. In addition, accepting too many orders leads to an over-loaded production environment, where lead times increase and orders are delivered late. Most of these aspects of order acceptance decision-making can be handled by having proper negotiations with customers on order terms. However, this is a complex problem primarily because there are dierent actors who have various (conicting) interests, needs and objectives. Accordingly, to provide insight for the decision makers in the rms in order to develop proper strategies for order acceptance, developing appropriate models seems necessary.The objective in this research is to improve the order acceptance performance of a make-to-order multi-plant enterprise (MPE) by incorporating buyer-seller negotiations in its OA procedure with the main research question of How can the buyer-seller negotiation process contribute to the improvement of order acceptance performance in the multi-plant enterprise?For this purpose, we have developed an agent-based model to support order acceptance decisions in a multi-plant enterprise particularly using dierent negotiation settings.The research starts with literature review on order acceptance in general and negotiation in particular. A gap is identied in the OA literature: the major perspectives on the OA procedure rest on the underlying assumption that order terms are already determined which is not always tenable. In reality, order terms are usually specied by negotiation between the buyer and the seller and they are not predetermined. A negotiation-based order acceptance approach is consequently suggested in order to consider the whole activities in a negotiation process with three phases. The proposed process involves the initiation conditions for negotiation (pre-negotiation phase), the main interaction (negotiation phase) and the consequences of negotiation on the future decisions of the involved actors (post-negotiation phase). This negotiation process is a part of more general negotiation framework which is then extended into a negotiation ontology. The ontology introduces the main concepts and their relations in a negotiation problem. Next, the conceptualization of the order negotiation process in OA and the negotiation ontology are used in developing an agent-based model for buyer-seller negotiations in a case of multi-plant enterprise. The general assumptions and settings for model development are taken from a model have been presented by Behdani et al. (2010) for a lube oil multi-plant case study motivated by a real supply chain.In this research, the previous model is extended by incorporating negotiation between the ii enterprise and its customers on order terms. Final...

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Section: Negotiation Basicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An agent-based model to support negotiation-based order acceptance in a multi-plant enterprise

Mobini

Behdani

Lukszo

et al. 2011

2011 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics

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“…Pioneering contributions on issue linkage are those by Tollison andWillett (1979), Haas (1980) and Sebenius (1983). They propose this mechanism to promote cooperation not only on environmental matters, but also on other issues, e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation

Buchner¹,

Carraro²,

Cersosimo³

et al. 2005

Advances in Global Change Research

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Terms of use: Documents in Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation SummaryThe US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties drastically reduce the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. The reason is not only the reduced emission abatement in the US, but also the spillover effects on technology and countries' relative bargaining power induced by the US decision. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse whether an incentive strategy exists that could induce the US to revise their decision and to comply with the Kyoto commitments. One solution, occasionally proposed in the literature and in actual policymaking, is to link negotiations on climate change control with decisions concerning international R&D cooperation. This paper explores this idea by analysing on the one hand the incentives for EU, Japan and Russia to adopt this strategy, and on the other hand the incentives for the US to join a coalition which cooperates both on climate change control and on technological innovation. The extended regime in which cooperation takes place on both dimensions (GHG emissions and R&D) will be examined from the view point of countries' profitability and freeriding incentives. Finally, after having assessed the effectiveness and credibility of the issue linkage strategy, we explore the economic and environmental benefits of a new, recently proposed regime, which aims at achieving GHG emission control by enhancing cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion (without targets on emissions).

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“…6 3 For example, Cesar 1994; Cesar and de Zeeuw 1996;Batabyal 1996;Helm 1998;Ecchia and Mariotti 1998, Barrett 1999. 4 Carraro 1997 See, in particular, Iklé 1964; Tollison and Willett 1979;Haas 1980;Sebenius 1983. 6 International environmental cooperation is defined here to be 'wider' if it includes more countries with responsibility for the environmental problem.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other

Neumayer¹

2001

Global Environmental Politics

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Economic theorists of international environmental cooperation and regime theorists who focus on the environment ask the same two basic research questions: why does international environmental cooperation emerge in some cases, but not in others, and why is cooperation wide and deep in some cases, but not in others? Unfortunately, the two schools of thought do not collaborate much in their respective attempts to answer these and related questions. Instead, mutual neglect is the general rule. This paper explores how regime theory can learn from the findings of the economic theory of international environmental cooperation and vice versa, and it examines the prospects for reciprocal learning. An exploitation of mutual learning opportunities is likely to lead to a more comprehensive understanding of international environmental cooperation, and it can ultimately result in better policy advice. Copyright (c) 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations

Cited by 255 publications

References 13 publications

An agent-based model to support negotiation-based order acceptance in a multi-plant enterprise

An agent-based model to support negotiation-based order acceptance in a multi-plant enterprise

Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation

How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other

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