An approximate truthfulness motivated spectrum auction for dynamic spectrum access

Abstract

Abstract-Secondary Spectrum Auction (SSA) has been proposed as an effective approach to design spectrum sharing mechanism for dynamic spectrum access. However, due to the location-constrained spectrum interference among users, it is a great challenge to provide truthful auction with maximized spectrum utilization. Most previous SSA designs either fail in addressing truthfulness or cause loss on spectrum utilization. In this paper, we focus on providing truthful SSA with maximized spectrum utilization. In order to minimize the computational overhead involved in addressing location-constrained interference, we leverage the truthfulness by introducing approximate truthfulness. Moreover, we define a general spectrum auction model using linear programming. Based on this model, we further propose ETEX, a sealed-bid auction mechanism with approximate truthfulness. Theoretical analysis confirms that ETEX is able to achieve truthfulness in expectation with polynomial complexity. Extensive experimental results show that ETEX outperforms most popular truthful spectrum auctions in terms of social welfare, spectrum utilization and user satisfaction.

Approximately Truthful Mechanisms for Radio Spectrum Allocation

“…The interference constraints require that any two bidders i and j sharing an edge are not allowed to be assigned to the same channel, i.e., ∀k ∈ K, a ik a jk = 0 if ∀(i, j) ∈ E, which can be linearized by (7) due to the integer constraints in (8). This optimization problem is named as SA-SR (Spectrum Allocation with Strict Request).…”

“…Approximate truthfulness is sufficient to guarantee bidders not to lie in auctions [22], [25]. Moreover, it is helpful to make the mechanism designer focus on designing efficient allocation algorithm to improve allocative efficiency (including social welfare and spectrum utilization) [8]. We first propose a computationally efficient mechanism that achieves truthful in expectation.…”

“…The concept of approximate truthfulness is firstly introduced in our conference paper [8] for spectrum auction design, where an auction achieving truthful in expectation for strict request model (named as ETEX) is proposed. ETEX is based on the assumption that bidders are risk-neutral.…”

DOTA: A Double Truthful Auction for spectrum allocation in dynamic spectrum access

“…However, they do not take truthfulness into account. A number of truthful spectrum auctions [8], [9], [10] have been designed, but most of they only support singlesided auctions. Existing double auctions including single-unit [11], [12] and multi-unit [12], [14] provide truthfulness but do not exploit spectrum reusability.…”

“…Most previous truthful designs for spectrum allocation (e.g., [8], [9], [10]) focus on single-sided buyer-only auctions under the assumption that sellers always trust the central authority. Nevertheless, sellers in reality are usually selfish and actively participate in auctions.…”