2021
DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12853
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An Application of Shapley Value Cost Allocation to Liquidity Savings Mechanisms

Abstract: Bank of Canada staff working papers provide a forum for staff to publish work-in-progress research independently from the Bank's Governing Council. This research may support or challenge prevailing policy orthodoxy. Therefore, the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and may differ from official Bank of Canada views. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank.

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…With Y i said I in the case of a project I partners from the alliance profit maximum V ( I ) in income, namely, the income gained by the each participant in the I uses letters to represent Y , this model is a cost allocation which should not only meet the rationality of overall but also at the same time to meet the individual rationality [ 25 , 26 ], as shown below: where V ( I ) represents the benefit that I, a participant, can obtain by completing the project alone, and V ( I ) represents the maximum benefit that can be obtained in many cooperative alliances [ 27 , 28 ]. At this point, we get the Shapley value we want to find, which is called Y i ( v ): where S is a subset of all combinations of I , and | S | is the number of project-related stakeholders in a collaboration S , and W (| S |) is the weight.…”
Section: Basic Theory Of Air Pollution Control Cost Allocationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With Y i said I in the case of a project I partners from the alliance profit maximum V ( I ) in income, namely, the income gained by the each participant in the I uses letters to represent Y , this model is a cost allocation which should not only meet the rationality of overall but also at the same time to meet the individual rationality [ 25 , 26 ], as shown below: where V ( I ) represents the benefit that I, a participant, can obtain by completing the project alone, and V ( I ) represents the maximum benefit that can be obtained in many cooperative alliances [ 27 , 28 ]. At this point, we get the Shapley value we want to find, which is called Y i ( v ): where S is a subset of all combinations of I , and | S | is the number of project-related stakeholders in a collaboration S , and W (| S |) is the weight.…”
Section: Basic Theory Of Air Pollution Control Cost Allocationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A newer strand of literature explores an alternative approach, by taking seriously the incentives of the participants arising from the costs they face for liquidity provision and the benefits of settling their payments. Garratt (2019) proposed a mechanism using the Shapley value cost allocation method. In their mechanism, to ensure that the welfare-maximizing netting proposals are always accepted, participants receive take-it-or-leave-it offers to contribute the needed liquidity.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that to treat Equation 7 as our benchmark, we implicitly assume the existence of a planner that implements the allocation of initial liquidity that minimizes total costs or some form of cooperation between the parties, for example via side payments to allow them to share the costs (Garratt 2019). Treated as a cooperative solution, if the sum of both agents costs are above the average costs, there would still be room for better learning performance, albeit one that might be hard to achieve when both agents learn independently.…”
Section: Searchmentioning
confidence: 99%