An Anatomy of Accountability at the WTO

Abstract

Accountability is fundamental to democratic governance and good administration, but its multiple meanings and claimants challenge international organizations. Who is accountable implies who can be accountable, and the matters for which some process exists to hold them accountable through some effect on their behavior. The answers to those questions in the World Trade Organization (WTO) will differ depending on who is asking and on the values to be promoted, from international order, procedural fairness, prosperity and justice to sustainable development. An anatomy of accountability in the WTO finds many possible 'accountability regimes', illuminating the tension between vertical and horizontal accountability (domestic responsiveness and international obligation) and the challenge in choosing among horizontal accountability regimes (promise keeping by members): efforts to satisfy any one accountability claim can make achieving the others more difficult. Policy Implications• International organizations such as the WTO face a choice between horizontal accountability for international obligations and vertical democratic responsiveness.• Institutional designers must choose among differing conceptions of the purposes for which organizations ought to be accountable, because the processes through which such accountability can be pursued will not be identical.

Learning About Digital Trade: Privacy and E-Commerce in CETA and TPP

“…Once the parties have an agreement on paper, they have to bring it to life, which depends on effective institutional design. Reciprocal obligations, the basis of any trade agreement, depend on opportunities for the constant development and affirmation of shared understanding of what the obligations mean (Wolfe, 2015). Such opportunities require transparency; and accountability to partners.…”

Trade Agreements and International Regulatory Cooperation in a Supply Chain World

“…In practice it is difficult to envisage how formal State-to-State dispute settlement along standard trade agreement (WTO-type) lines could work given the focus of regulatory cooperation on processes that are endogenous, with significant ex ante uncertainty as to whether equivalence exists or convergence is possible. Much of what is involved in the proposals made above is not judiciable by either the governments involved ("horizontal accountability") or by firms or citizens ("vertical accountability") (Wolfe, 2015) in the sense of formal dispute settlement procedures between States or citizens taking governments to court. Given that the goal is to have regulatory systems advancing together, and that regulatory equivalence is highly dependent on trust and learning, formal litigation is not desirable as it is likely to have adverse impacts on the willingness of agencies to engage in cooperation.…”

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“…Firms must assess the economic costs of the foreign restriction, convince their own government to launch a WTO dispute, help prepare the legal case, and help motivate policy change if the dispute succeeds (Bown, 2009). It follows that only large firms can rely on dispute settlement to enforce market access, increasing the role for governments in using surveillance mechanisms to ensure that their trading partners are accountable for meeting their obligations (Wolfe, 2014).…”