An analysis of the German university admissions system

Westkamp, Alexander

doi:10.1007/s00199-012-0704-4

Cited by 115 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 42 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…9 We therefore conclude that the observed choice of randomized outcomes appears to 8 The mechanism is analyzed in Braun et al (2010), Braun et al (2012) and Westkamp (2013), pointing to a particular strategic feature of the mechanism that applicants fail to understand: the fact that the mechanism involves a sequence of procedures affects the truth-telling incentives at the early stages because the applicants have to consider the effect of moving to the next procedure. In this paper we use these and other results from the literature on matching algorithms to rule out the possibility that rational strategic considerations may induce preference reversals that look like a preference for randomization.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence

2013

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate the possibility that a decision-maker prefers to avoid making a decision and instead delegates it to an external device, e.g., a coin flip. In a series of experiments the participants often choose lotteries between allocations, which contradicts most theories of choice such as expected utility but is consistent with a theory of responsibility aversion that implies a preference for randomness. A large data set on university applications in Germany shows a choice pattern that is also consistent with this theory and entails substantial allocative consequences.JEL-Code: D030, D010.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence

2013

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The clearinghouse is a mixed system, in the first phase (for the best students) the Boston-mechanism is used and in the second phase the college-proposing Gale-Shapley, so the process is not incentive compatible for the group of best students [10,26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

College admissions with stable score-limits

Bíró

Kiselgof

2013

Cent Eur J Oper Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A common feature of the Hungarian, Irish, Spanish and Turkish higher education admission systems is that the students apply for programmes and are ranked according to their scores. Students who apply for a programme with the same score are tied. Ties are broken by lottery in Ireland, by objective factors in Turkey (such as date of birth) and other precisely defined rules in Spain. In Hungary, however, an equal treatment policy is used, students applying for a programme with the same score are all accepted or rejected together. In such a situation there is only one decision to make, whether or not to admit the last group of applicants with the same score who are at the boundary of the quota. Both concepts can be described in terms of stable score-limits. The strict rejection of the last group with whom a quota would be violated corresponds to the concept of H-stable (i.e. higher-stable) score-limits that is currently used in Hungary. We call the other solutions based on the less strict admission policy as L-stable (i.e. lower-stable) score-limits. We show that the natural extensions of the Gale-Shapley algorithms produce stable score-limits, moreover, the applicant-oriented versions result in the lowest score-limits (thus optimal for students) and the college-oriented versions result in the highest score-limits with regard to each concept. When comparing the applicant-optimal H-stable and L-stable score-limits we prove that the former limits are always higher for every college. Furthermore, these two solutions provide upper and lower boundaries for any solution arising from a tie-breaking strategy. Finally we show that both the H-stable and the L-stable applicant-proposing score-limit algorithms are manipulable.

show abstract

“…Westkamp [29] studies the German university admissions system, where priorities may also vary across slots, and Braun et al [4] and Braun et al [5] complement his analysis by conducting a field experiment and a laboratory experiment, respectively. The laboratory experiment confirms the result in Westkamp [29] that the mechanism that is currently used for university admissions in Germany, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them. Kamada and Kojima [22] The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Affirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Minority reserves are an affirmative action policy proposed by Hafalir et al. [20] in the context of school choice. We study in the laboratory the effect of minority reserves on the outcomes of two prominent matching mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms. Our first experimental result is that the introduction of minority reserves enhances truth-telling of some minority students under the Gale-Shapley but not under the Top Trading Cycles mechanism. Secondly, for the Gale-Shapley mechanism we also find that the stable matchings that are more beneficial to students are obtained more often relative to the other stable matchings when minority reserves are introduced. Finally, the overall expected payoff increases under the Gale-Shapley but decreases under the Top Trading Cycles mechanism if minority reserves are introduced. However, the minority group benefits and the majority group is harmed under both mechanisms.

show abstract

An analysis of the German university admissions system

Cited by 115 publications

References 42 publications

Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence

Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence

College admissions with stable score-limits

Affirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About