An analysis of private health insurance purchasing decisions with national health insurance in Taiwan

Liu, Tsai-Ching; Chen, Chin-Shyan

doi:10.1016/s0277-9536(01)00201-5

Cited by 92 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…The main reason for using different estimation methods is that most empirical research on health insurance and medical care utilization is based on cross-sectional analyses (e.g. Jones et al, 2006;Stabile, 2001;Gruber and Poterba, 1994;Wolfe and Goddeeris, 1991;Savage and Wright, 2003;Harmon and Nolan, 2001;Holly et al, 1998;Hurd and McGarry, 1997;Blumberg et al, 2001;Chernew et al, 1997;Liu and Chen, 2002;Vera-Hernández, 1999;Bundorf et al, 2005;Ettner, 1997;Cameron et al, 1988). Using different estimation methods we can assess better whether our results conform with other findings in the literature and how deviations from these models change the estimation results.…”

Section: Empirical Modelmentioning

confidence: 59%

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar¹,

Lindeboom

Klaauw

2008

SSRN Journal

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We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences.Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.

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Section: Empirical Modelmentioning

confidence: 59%

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar¹,

Lindeboom

Klaauw

2008

SSRN Journal

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“…Nguyen and Knowles [8], Shafie and Hassali [7], and other studies have reported the same relationship [17,18]. In fact, the higher the income level, the greater the ability of a household to pay and the probability of a household to demand voluntary health insurance.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 67%

Demand for Self-Employed Health Insurance

2017

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Objective: Health insurance provides financial support for health care expenditures. There are two types of health insurance: compulsory and voluntary. Voluntary health insurance can be divided into two categories: self-employed and supplementary. In this study, the main factors that affect the demand for self-employed health insurance in Iran were determined. Materials and Methods:In this cross-sectional study, data were derived from the 2013 Household Income and Expenditure Survey from the Statistical Center of Iran. Then, a logistic regression model was designed to determine the factors influencing health insurance demand. Results:The age, income, and education level of the head of the household directly correlated with the demand for self-employed health insurance. There was no significant relationship between the demand for health insurance and the gender or marital status of the head of the household. In addition, there were no significant relationships between occupation or house ownership and the demand for health insurance in rural households. Conclusion:To promote voluntary health insurance, it is helpful to identify effective factors that stimulate the health insurance demand.

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“…Absolute risk aversion is directly related to the number of household members (i.e. children and spouse), and is markedly higher in larger families [16]. Interestingly, the function of private health insurance is not only covering healthcare expenditures due to hospitalization, but also provides risk reduction for economic costs of raising children.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The determinants of private health insurance are explored based on accessibility to healthcare services [7,8,13], labor income sensitivity [14][15][16], medication for chronic diseases [12], behaviors regarding preventive care [6], quality of healthcare services [17,18], and supplemental roles of private health insurance for public health insurance [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Health Insurance and Hospitalization Under Japanese National Health Insurance

Yamada¹,

Chen²,

Yamada³

et al. 2009

TOECONSJ

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We empirically examine how the decision to purchase private health insurance and hospitalization are made based on labor income, socio-demographic factors, and private health insurance. The increase in household labor income and wealth has a positive effect on purchasing private health insurance. This suggests a supplementary effect for public health insurance under the strict control of a two-tier healthcare coverage system. Our results support the hypothesis that moral hazard presents for the costs paid to private health insurance by households. A strong positive association with the risk of hospitalization causes individuals to change their health behavior after purchasing private health insurance leading to lower costs in the ill health status and acquire less preventive measures. Thus, moral hazard exists in Japanese health insurance market. Unlike the previous study, adverse selection based on our results is not negligible in the case of hospitalization in Japan. The positive effect indicates that the higher the risk of illness with households, the more insurance policies a household possesses. The results support our hypotheses that the decision to purchase health insurance in case of death in an insured household in a hospital is attributed to the initial health stock of the household. This means that households purchase private health insurance when there is a high probability of hospitalization with claimed insurance on death. The benefits from private health insurance policies for hospitalization provide incentives for individuals to purchase health insurance that are a reflection of adverse selection against private health insurance. Terms of use: Documents in

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An analysis of private health insurance purchasing decisions with national health insurance in Taiwan

Cited by 92 publications

References 22 publications

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Demand for Self-Employed Health Insurance

Private Health Insurance and Hospitalization Under Japanese National Health Insurance

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