An Analysis of DoS Attack Strategies Against the LTE RAN

Jermyn, Jill; Salles-Loustau, Gabriel; Zonouz, Saman

doi:10.13052/jcsm2245-1439.323

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…However their DoS attacks are against the network and not against LTE subscribers. Through simulations the authors in [62] show that Botnets can cause DoS attacks by exhausting subscriber traffic capacity over the air interface. A proof of concept paper by P. Jover et al [63] provides an overview of new effective attacks (smart jamming) that extend the range and effectiveness of basic radio jamming.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems

Shaik¹,

Borgaonkar²,

Asokan³

et al. 2016

Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

186

178

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Abstract-Mobile communication systems are now an essential part of life throughout the world. Fourth generation "Long Term Evolution" (LTE) mobile communication networks are being deployed. The LTE suite of specifications is considered to be significantly better than its predecessors not only in terms of functionality but also with respect to security and privacy for subscribers. We carefully analyzed LTE access network protocol specifications and uncovered several vulnerabilities. Using commercial LTE mobile devices in real LTE networks, we demonstrate inexpensive, and practical attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities. Our first class of attacks consists of three different ways of making an LTE device leak its location: In our experiments, a semi-passive attacker can locate an LTE device within a 2 km 2 area in a city whereas an active attacker can precisely locate an LTE device using GPS co-ordinates or trilateration via cell-tower signal strength information. Our second class of attacks can persistently deny some or all services to a target LTE device. To the best of our knowledge, our work constitutes the first publicly reported practical attacks against LTE access network protocols.We present several countermeasures to resist our specific attacks. We also discuss possible trade-off considerations that may explain why these vulnerabilities exist. We argue that justification for these trade-offs may no longer valid. We recommend that safety margins introduced into future specifications to address such trade-offs should incorporate greater agility to accommodate subsequent changes in the trade-off equilibrium.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems

Shaik¹,

Borgaonkar²,

Asokan³

et al. 2016

Proceedings 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

186

178

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As opposed to the DoS attacks against the UE, Jover et al [15] discuss a DoS attack against the EPC using a compromised UE/eNodeB that sends huge number of attach request messages to the EPC and thus takes the EPC down. Jermyn et al [55] show a similar DoS attack and simulate a set of compromised UEs that exhaust the victim UEs' traffic capacity. Golde et al [38] exploit a race condition in the paging message responses in 2G networks that enables a malicious UE to send the paging response message before the victim UE, and thus preventing the victim UE from receiving incoming phone calls/SMS.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

LTEInspector: A Systematic Approach for Adversarial Testing of 4G LTE

Hussain

Chowdhury

Mehnaz

et al. 2018

Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

155

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In this paper, we investigate the security and privacy of the three critical procedures of the 4G LTE protocol (i.e., attach, detach, and paging), and in the process, uncover potential design flaws of the protocol and unsafe practices employed by the stakeholders. For exposing vulnerabilities, we propose a modelbased testing approach LTEInspector which lazily combines a symbolic model checker and a cryptographic protocol verifier in the symbolic attacker model. Using LTEInspector, we have uncovered 10 new attacks along with 9 prior attacks, categorized into three abstract classes (i.e., security, user privacy, and disruption of service), in the three procedures of 4G LTE. Notable among our findings is the authentication relay attack that enables an adversary to spoof the location of a legitimate user to the core network without possessing appropriate credentials. To ensure that the exposed attacks pose real threats and are indeed realizable in practice, we have validated 8 of the 10 new attacks and their accompanying adversarial assumptions through experimentation in a real testbed.

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“…Jermyn and Zonunz, [35] studied the DoS attacks on the LTE and MAC uplink scheduler that cause several attacks. They state that such attacks depend on the QoSs (Quality of Services) requested by the clients.…”

Section: Radio and Wireless Network Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on Security for Smartphone Device

Zaidi¹,

Shah²,

Kamran³

et al. 2016

ijacsa

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Abstract-The technological advancements in mobile connectivity services such as GPRS, GSM, 3G, 4G, Blue-tooth, WiMAX, and Wi-Fi made mobile phones a necessary component of our daily lives. Also, mobile phones have become smart which let the users perform routine tasks on the go. However, this rapid increase in technology and tremendous usage of the smartphones make them vulnerable to malware and other security breaching attacks. This diverse range of mobile connectivity services, device software platforms, and standards make it critical to look at the holistic picture of the current developments in smartphone security research. In this paper, our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we review the threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and their solutions over the period of 2010-2015 with a special focus on smartphones. Attacks are categorized into two types, i.e., old attack and new attacks. With this categorization, we aim to provide an easy and concise view of different attacks and the possible solutions to improve smartphone security. Secondly, we critically analyze our findings and estimate the market growth of different operating systems for the smartphone in coming years. Furthermore, we estimate the malware growth and forecast the world in 2020.

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An Analysis of DoS Attack Strategies Against the LTE RAN

Cited by 11 publications

References 20 publications

Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems

Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems

LTEInspector: A Systematic Approach for Adversarial Testing of 4G LTE

A Survey on Security for Smartphone Device

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