An alternative reading of religion and authoritarianism: the new logic between religion and state in the AKP’s New Turkey

Abstract

Since roughly 2011, the Turkish state and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been going through a process of mutual transformation. Some of the historical apprehensions, biases and frustrations exhibited by Turkey as a middle power been absorbed by the relatively reformist AKP. Conversely, the AKP and its undisputed leader Erdoğan have seen their socio-political fears, power based conflicts and ethno-religious desires become dominant in all areas, including religion. As a consequence of this bilateral transformation, Turkey has become both an inclusionary and a hegemonic-authoritarian state, and at the same time a weak one. Within this new identity and structure of the state, Sunni Islam has become one of the regime's key focal points, with a new logic. This article seeks to explain the transformation of the relations between the AKP's Turkish state, religion and religious groups, by scrutinising Karrie Koesel's logic of state-religion interaction in authoritarian regimes.

NGOization of Islamic Education: The Post-Coup Turkish State and Sufi Orders in Africa South of the Sahara

“…Although Sufi orders and state institutions historically represent two divergent and conflicting streams of Islamic education in Turkey, the analysis of Erenköy Cemaati's schools in Africa south of the Sahara reveal their rapprochement in novel ways. The analytical division between official (state) and unofficial (Sufi) Islam (Öztürk 2019;Sakallioglu 1996), this article, therefore, argues, fails to explain the Sufi communities' relations with state institutions in the context of Islamic education in Africa. One of the indications of the blurring of the boundaries between official and unofficial Islam is the promotion of the model of imam-hatip school, the vocational schools created by the early Republican regime to train religious functionaries (imams and hatips) to disseminate official Islam, by the educators affiliated with a Sufi community.…”

“…This lead to the adoption of a new law that uprooted the organized religious life with the abolition of Sufi orders and closing of their lodges in 1925 (Silverstein 2011). Rather than the disappearance of Sufi orders, the proscription brought the bifurcation of the religious sphere into official Islam represented by the newly founded Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and unofficial Islam represented by Sufi orders surviving underground (Öztürk 2019;Sakallioglu 1996). With tariqas being legally banned, cemaat (community) came to define the associational form the Sufi orders took under the Republican regime.…”

Critical Junctures of Securitisation: The Case of the AK Party in Turkey

“…There is a rich literature on authoritarianism, semi-authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism and illberalisation. With the turn of the century, scholars continued to investigate the definitions (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Brownlee, 2007) and classifications (Bogaards, 2009) of authoritarianisms as well as how these concepts relate to institutions (Przeworski et al, 2000) and identity (Fish, 2002; Öztürk, 2019). The question of how a regime devolves from democracy to authoritarianism, or from one kind of authoritarianism to another, still needs further investigation.…”

Limits of post‐secularism in Turkey: Comparing the attitudes of the Justice and Development Party towards the headscarf and Alevi issues

“…Although the AKP has been promoting a Sunni version of Islam, Öztürk () argues that it has gained excessive power to control unofficial Sunni groups in the wake of defeating “secular‐Kemalist tutelage” with the help of para‐political Islamic groups like the Fetullahçı s . Both Kara and Öztürk are critical to the “controlling” aspect of the Republican secularism, and the Diyanet represents this aspect shaped in flesh and bones.…”

“…Both Kara and Öztürk are critical to the “controlling” aspect of the Republican secularism, and the Diyanet represents this aspect shaped in flesh and bones. Interestingly enough, while Kara (, p. 196) rejects the transfer of this institution to unofficial religious groups or communities because they are not capable of delivering the services ascribed to the Diyanet , Öztürk (, p. 92) asserts rise of new authoritarian logic between the state and religion. However, both accounts seem to disregard or ignore the negative repercussions of the regression of the Turkish secularism on ordinary Sunnis' having no attachment to any unofficial groups or on Alevis' and nonbelievers' daily lives.…”