Civil unmanned aircraft will need to meet stringent safety standards before they are certified to operate in the national airspace of the United States. Reliability is a key requirement for certification. Most current civil unmanned aircraft are not reliable because of the presence of single points-of-failure and the use of low-reliability components. For example: Many fixed-wing unmanned aircraft are equipped with only two aerodynamic control surfaces. A fault in any one surface will usually spell catastrophe. This paper demonstrates how this single point-of-failure can be removed using multi-variable control laws. A single aerodynamic control surface is shown to be sufficient to stabilize the aircraft and execute a set of limited maneuvers. These limited maneuvers are sufficient to safely fly to a landing spot. This concept is proved using flight tests on an unmanned aircraft at the University of Minnesota. The results are also applicable to manned commercial aircraft. Controllability with one surface indicates the large potential to mitigate faults that might otherwise lead to loss-of-control events. I. Introduction Recently, unmanned aerial vehicles/systems (UAVs/UASs) have found increasing civilian and commercial applications, such as law enforcement, search and rescue, and precision agriculture. These commercial applications require UAVs to operate in civilian airspace. Central to operating UAVs in civilian airspace is the challenge of meeting the stringent safety standards set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In 2012, the United States Congress passed H.R.658 1-the FAA Modernization and Reform Act-in order to facilitate the safe integration of UASs into the national airspace. In particular, section 332 of H.R.658 mandates the FAA to "provide for the safe integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system as soon as practicable, but not later than September 30, 2015." More recently, the FAA released the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 2 This is thought to be the precursor to the impending release of detailed policy. This brings in legislative and policy dimensions to what is academically seen as a technical challenge. To put this challenge in perspective, consider the current safety standards set by the FAA for manned commercial aircraft. In order for a manned commercial aircraft to be certified, there should be no more than one catastrophic failure per 10 9 flight hours. Commercial aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing, meet the 10 −9 failures-per-flight-hour standard by utilizing hardware redundancy. For example, the Boeing 777 has 14 spoilers each with its own actuator; two actuators each for the outboard ailerons, left & right elevators, and flaperons; and three actuators for the single rudder. 3 On the other hand, most civil UAVs have reliabilities that are orders of magnitude below 10 −9. For instance, the UAV Research Group at the University of Minnesota (UMN) 4 operates an Ultra Stick 120 aircraft (described further in section II.B) with single-string, off-...