2010
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511779527
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'Armed Attack' and Article 51 of the UN Charter

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Cited by 104 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…The implication is an erosion of the "compliance pull" of the Jus ad bellum, which can only be remedied by a much-needed clarification of the law.' 88 Instead, I suggest that the legal regime on the use of force by states cannot be understood as a fixed distinction between legal and illegal acts; legality of a war is not a function of its relation to a pre-given set of rules, and the ban on war does not function as an objective standard by which state conduct can be judged to be either lawful or unlawful. The law may perhaps contribute to international order but it does not do so by holding firm the line against inter-state 'aggression'.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The implication is an erosion of the "compliance pull" of the Jus ad bellum, which can only be remedied by a much-needed clarification of the law.' 88 Instead, I suggest that the legal regime on the use of force by states cannot be understood as a fixed distinction between legal and illegal acts; legality of a war is not a function of its relation to a pre-given set of rules, and the ban on war does not function as an objective standard by which state conduct can be judged to be either lawful or unlawful. The law may perhaps contribute to international order but it does not do so by holding firm the line against inter-state 'aggression'.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, according to Tom Ruys, 'up until the end of the nineteenth century, the predominant conviction was that every State had a customary right, inherent in sovereignty itself, to embark upon war whenever it pleased.' 12 This right was activated when a sovereign claimed to have experienced a harm at the hands of a foreign agent. The pre-1945 discourse of war legitimation emphasised the existence of harm and the legitimacy of the use of force in response.…”
Section: The Permissive Power Of the Ban On Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…It could not be used to justify the blockade of Cuba in 1962. In that incident, the United States did not attempt to justify the naval quarantine imposed on Cuba aimed at impeding the delivery of offensive weapons and materials by Soviet Union to Cuba as an exercise of self-defence because there was no indication that the United States was confronted by an 'imminent threat of an armed attack', and this implied that the action came under the category of 'preservative' rather than 'pre-emptive' self-defence (Ruys, 2010). Similarly, Israel's airstrike against the Osiraq reactor in Iraq in 1981 could not be considered an act of self-defence because 'there was no armed attack on the US in 1962 anymore than there was on Israel in 1981' (Note 18).…”
Section: Anticipatory Self-defencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…… For this reason, the US strike against a number of Al Qaeda suspects in Yemen in November 2002, and carried out in cooperation with Yemeni authorities, could not be justified on the basis of Article 51 UN Charter.' ' Ruys 2010, at p. 377 n. 39. See Naert 2004 a state of necessity.…”
Section: International Law Aspects Of the Jus Ad Bellummentioning
confidence: 99%