Among leaders and territories: the political networks of the district councillors in Naples

Brancaccio, Luciano

doi:10.1007/s11135-011-9495-0

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…For grassroots government leader, on one side, they hold strong ties with the higher-level politicians; on the other side, they play a fundamental role in taking care of the voters and collecting the electoral consensus (Brancaccio, 2011). Grassroots government leaders have three key tasks, including setting the agenda in developing strategic direction, building and maintaining networks both internally (cohesiveness) and externally (representational), implementing policy to accomplish tasks (Steyvers et al, 2008).…”

Section: The Sta Of Grassroots Government Leadermentioning

confidence: 99%

The formation of high strategic thinking ability: a study of Chinese grassroots cadres

Liu²,

Jin³

2022

IJPL

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PurposeThe purpose of the research is to identify the factors contributing to the formation of high-level strategic thinking ability (STA) of Chinese grassroots cadres.Design/methodology/approachThrough in-depth interviews with 20 Chinese grassroots cadres with high-level STA and grounded theory method, this research explores the contributive factors for the formation of the grassroots cadres' STA from a dynamic and long-term perspective.FindingsThe formation of STA is an accumulative process based on the interaction between external factors, including wide space for activities, adequate supporting resources, demonstration of role model, and inflection point and internal drivers, including strong sense of self-actualization, high sense of responsibility, thinking enhancement skills, diverse knowledge and high openness. Moreover, the external factors play a more important role in shaping STA in the early growth stage of the grassroots cadres, while in the late stage the internal factors tend to dominate.Practical implicationsThe study advises to offer more professional training on STA and take STA as an important factor for Chinese grassroots cadres to compete in a complex socio-political environment in the long term.Originality/value(1) This paper investigates into the STA of Chinese grassroots cadres, which are largely ignored in current literature; (2) different from the extant studies which studies the static influencing factors of STA, such as demographic variables, personal traits and organizational characteristics, this paper focuses on the dynamic and long-term factors during the growth of the cadres.

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Section: The Sta Of Grassroots Government Leadermentioning

confidence: 99%

The formation of high strategic thinking ability: a study of Chinese grassroots cadres

Liu²,

Jin³

2022

IJPL

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“…The brokers have detailed local knowledge, which allows them to perform their activities while effectively avoiding detection. Historiographic and fieldwork analyzes show the importance of these brokers and their practices in clientelism (See: Brancaccio, 2011; Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Sun et al ., 2014; Acosta, 2017; El Heraldo, 2014).…”

Section: A Simple Model Of Subnational Public Choice With Clientelism...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Political machines and the curse of public resources in subnational democracies

Cendales

Garza

Arcila

2021

JES

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PurposeThis paper argues that decentralization reforms in Colombia, implemented since the 1980s, have led to the decentralization of political clientelism rather than its demise. Clientelism is a system of political and economic institutions that turns every local democracy into an extractive political institution. The authors theoretically demonstrate that an increase in public resources will increase corruption.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop and test a subnational public choice model, where clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration constitute a stable long-term institutional equilibrium. The model comprises two linked subgames: electoral tournament and corruption in public policy. The model makes two predictions that currently oppose predominant approaches: (1) increasing the severity of jail sentences to electoral crimes increases their price and the predominance of machine politics, instead of improving the quality of electoral tournaments and (2) increasing local governments' public finance increases clientelism in elections and corruption in public administration.FindingsThe authors find evidence in favor of the theoretical model of curse of public resources, using difference-in-differences estimation with a database 2016–17 of Colombia's 1,034 municipalities. This country is well-suited for our analysis because it has a long-term commitment to formal democratic processes (since 1958), while plagued by endemic corruption and clientelism problems.Originality/value(1) The theoretical approach is innovative and disruptive of current models on the problem, (2) the model builds upon the Colombian situation, a country with prominent corruption and political violence problems regardless of its relatively long-term commitment with free elections (since 1958) and (3) the theoretical discussion is tested using a comprehensive set of difference-in-differences estimations.

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“…The paper by Brancaccio (2011), which deals with the relational networks of councillors at district level, closes the issue. District councils are the result of the administrative decentralization of the major Italian municipalities.…”

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confidence: 94%