Amicus Coalition Heterogeneity and Signaling Credibility in Supreme Court Agenda Setting

Goelzhauser, Greg; Vouvalis, Nicole

doi:10.1093/publius/pju027

Cited by 10 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Prior research has applied signaling theory to the Solicitor General's participation in Supreme Court cases (Bailey et al ) and to state advocacy at the agenda setting stage (Goelzhauser and Vouvalis ). However, each of the assumptions underlying signaling theory can be applied to amicus filers more generally.…”

Section: Signaling Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Friends You Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme Court

Manzi¹,

Hall²

2017

Law Soc Rev

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How do interest groups influence U.S. Supreme Court justices to vote in favor of their preferred outcomes? Following prior research on the influence of the Solicitor General, we develop and expand on the signaling theory of interest group influence via amicus curie briefs. We argue that an interest group's ideological reputation and the nature of the ideological signal it sends in its brief both function as powerful heuristics that convey information to the justices depending on the justices' own ideological preferences. When an organization files an amicus brief advocating for an outcome seemingly contrary to its traditional preferences (i.e., an unexpected signal), this signal should be more noticeable and credible than a signal in accordance with a group's conventional views (i.e., an expected signal). However, unexpected signals should have greater influence on justices who share the brief filer's preferences. We test our signaling theory on the terms from 1991 through 2002. We find that unexpected signals (but not expected signals) are associated with Supreme Court voting, and the influence of unexpected signals appears to be particularly strong among justices who share the ideological preferences of the brief filer.

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Section: Signaling Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Friends You Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme Court

Manzi¹,

Hall²

2017

Law Soc Rev

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“…Our analysis reveals that while the problem of organizational maintenance does appear to drive some of this litigating behavior, the desire to have policy influence and the awareness of the power of what we refer to as lateral precedent or policy development (Hollis‐Brusky ; Silverstein ) actually does most of the explanatory work. We also show how some of this behavior might be driven by what judicial politics scholars refer to as “coalitional goals” (Goelhauser and Vouvalis ; Farber ; Collins ; Caldeira and Wright 1990; Epstein 1985).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…So what explains these findings? We know from the judicial politics literature that “purposive” (Salisbury ) interest groups such as PILFs choose to participate in litigation for three principal reasons: to influence policy (Hansford ; Scheppele and Walker ; Caldeira and Wright 1990); for organizational maintenance reasons such as attracting and retaining funding and members (Solberg and Waltenburg ; Hansford ); and to build and maintain coalitions that could serve to attract new sources of funding, new members, and new opportunities for cost sharing and collaboration (Goelhauser and Vouvalis ; Farber ; Collins ; Caldeira and Wright 1990; Epstein 1985).…”

Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Playing for the Rules: How and Why New Christian Right Public Interest Law Firms Invest in Secular Litigation

Hollis‐Brusky

Wilson

2017

Law & Policy

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This article catalogues and analyzes the litigating behavior of four of the leading New Christian Right Public Interest Law Firms (NCR PILFs). Consistent with the finding from judicial politics that all PILFs seek first and foremost to have policy influence, we find that most of the litigation these PILFs invest in is either explicitly or implicitly religious or mission driven. However, we also observe a trend of increased participation in secular cases by the two largest NCR PILFs in our study. Through in‐depth, qualitative content analysis of the briefs submitted in these secular cases, we show that while some of this behavior can be attributed to organizational maintenance or coalitional goals, most of this secular participation appears motivated by a desire to influence the legal rules rather than the outcome of the particular case. In doing so, this article shows how PILFs engage with an increasingly complex legal and political landscape.

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“…Kearney and Merrill 2000), the diversity of constituencies represented in party and amicus briefs might also signal that a position receives broad public support (cf. Goelzhauser and Vouvalis 2014). Evidence of a varied coalition behind a position might also be useful to the Court in its efforts "to shape public opinion" (Collins 2004, 813) by assuring the public that the Court is responsive to the demands of a broad range of constituencies and is not predictably siding with particular interests.…”

Section: Polarized Support Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in the Roberts Court

Southworth¹

2018

Law soc. inq.

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This article considers the organizations, financial patrons, and lawyers involved in two significant campaign finance cases decided by the Roberts Court: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. The research indicates that these elements of the support structures for litigation on both sides of these cases, like the justices to whom they direct their advocacy, fall into well‐defined opposing and partisan camps. It also suggests that strategic case selection on the challengers' side, the diversity of organizations supporting their positions, their network and coordination, and a simple and powerful frame around which to rally may have contributed to their success and to the Roberts Court's fundamental reshaping of campaign finance doctrine.

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Amicus Coalition Heterogeneity and Signaling Credibility in Supreme Court Agenda Setting

Cited by 10 publications

References 45 publications

Friends You Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme Court

Friends You Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme Court

Playing for the Rules: How and Why New Christian Right Public Interest Law Firms Invest in Secular Litigation

Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in the Roberts Court

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