1982
DOI: 10.2307/2149312
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Americar Ideals versus American Institutions

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1983
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Cited by 54 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…The only explanations that can be found have highlighted metropolitan or domestic determinants. One such explanation draws upon American “exceptionalism” that insists that the United States has been unique for its enduring “liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values” forged by the nation's founding moments (Huntington 1982; Kammen 1993:6; Lipset 1996). For explaining imperial forms, the argument is that the United States has been inherently unwilling to adopt formal empire because its “democratic culture and institutions” (Ikenberry 2002:204), “the nature of its political culture” (Pagden 2005:54), its “unalterable foundation” in anti‐colonial and liberal principles (Schwabe 1986:30), or its lack of an aristocratic class (Porter 2006; Pratt 1958:114; Schwabe 1986:30; Smith 1994:148).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The only explanations that can be found have highlighted metropolitan or domestic determinants. One such explanation draws upon American “exceptionalism” that insists that the United States has been unique for its enduring “liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values” forged by the nation's founding moments (Huntington 1982; Kammen 1993:6; Lipset 1996). For explaining imperial forms, the argument is that the United States has been inherently unwilling to adopt formal empire because its “democratic culture and institutions” (Ikenberry 2002:204), “the nature of its political culture” (Pagden 2005:54), its “unalterable foundation” in anti‐colonial and liberal principles (Schwabe 1986:30), or its lack of an aristocratic class (Porter 2006; Pratt 1958:114; Schwabe 1986:30; Smith 1994:148).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the Third Reich is another most‐likely case for a general democratic presumption of autocratic aggressiveness, by Barbara Farnham’s (2003) account, Franklin Roosevelt prior to September 1938 was not convinced that Hitler had aggressive intentions. Farnham (2003:402) in fact indicates that even after the September 1938 crisis with Hitler, Roosevelt shared with other democratic leaders “a brief spell of relief and optimism” that with the gain of the Sudetenland Hitler had finally been satiated (see also Huntington 1982:21).…”
Section: A Theoretical Critique Of the Extension Hypothesis And Its Imentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The hypothesis is attuned to the possibility that democracy carries less moral weight in joint democracy dyads that include non‐Western states, and to the possibility that imposing regime‐change by force can bring resentment and indignation that countervail respect deriving from joint democraticness. The hypothesis also is free of premises embodied in the extension hypothesis that encourage democracy militancy against nondemocracies, specifically, the presumptions of democratic moral superiority abroad and autocratic inclination toward aggression (see also Huntington 1982:21–22; Cohen 1994:223; Jahn 2005).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, both Communist ideological‐states, came apart because they existed on civilizational fault lines, a situation the U.S. faces because it is not a “nation‐state in the classical sense of the term” (Huntington, 1997a:35). It is, in political terminology, an “ideological‐state” (see Huntington, 1989). Therefore, his fear is that America will come “undone.”…”
Section: The Real Focus Of Huntington's Thesis: America's Exceptionalmentioning
confidence: 99%