American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision

Rosenberg, David

doi:10.2307/1894674

Cited by 53 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These studies revealed the strong counterforce bias of U.S. strategic doctrine and reinforced the conclusion that limited nuclear exchanges would be difficult if not impossible to control (Rosenberg, 1979(Rosenberg, , 1983Friedberg, 1980;Ball, 1981;Schilling, 1981;Ball and Richelson, 1986;Sagan, 1989). In short, where scholarship in the Golden Age was necessarily abstract and "data-free," the study of nuclear weapons policy during the renaissance rested on a much firmer base of empirical support.…”

Section: New Developments In Security Studiesmentioning

confidence: 75%

The Renaissance of Security Studies

Walt

1991

International Studies Quarterly

652

171

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Studies Quarterly.

show abstract

Section: New Developments In Security Studiesmentioning

confidence: 75%

The Renaissance of Security Studies

Walt

1991

International Studies Quarterly

652

171

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Similarly, American weapons have always been aimed at a wide range of Soviet military targets as well as at Soviet cities. 34 President Carter's Presidential Directive 59 of July 1980, which took the position that the U.S. would not target the Soviet population per se, was not a change of policy. As early as January 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were arguing that the U.S. did not seek "to destroy large cities per se" but "only to attack such targets as are necessary in war in order to impose the national objections of the United States upon the enemy."…”

Section: Different Conceptions Of Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security regimes

Jervis¹

1982

Int Org

260

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Regimes are harder to establish in the security area than they are in the economic realm because of the inherently competitive cast of many security concerns, the unforgiving nature of the problems, and the difficulty in determining how much security the state has or needs. Nevertheless, there is at least one example of a functioning security regime—the Concert of Europe. Under the Concert the great powers sharply moderated their individualistic and competitive policies and exercised restraint in the expectation that others would reciprocate. The self-interest that they followed was broader and longer-run than usual. The Balance of Power, however, is a regime only if the restraints are internal, as Kaplan implies, as contrasted with Waltz's formulation in which states restrain each other. Current superpower relations should not be considered a regime because the principles, rules, and norms have little autonomy but instead can be best understood as quite direct reflections of the states' power and interests.

show abstract

“…Yet by June 1947, the stockpile amounted to only 13 implosion bombs, each taking 39 people two days to assemble (Rosenberg 1982). This lack of preparation was partly due to technical problems, particularly the scarcity of fissionable materials created by peacetime constraints of "efficiency and economy" imposed on the Manhattan Project (Rosenberg 1979). Significantly, the military pushed for a larger stockpile because production came under the budget of the Atomic Energy Commission and thus did not require cutbacks in other military programs.…”

Section: The Military Situationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Significantly, the military pushed for a larger stockpile because production came under the budget of the Atomic Energy Commission and thus did not require cutbacks in other military programs. As the idea of the bomb deterring war was accepted by the military in the summer 1947, it aimed to have 400 bombs by the early 1950s (Rosenberg 1979).…”

Section: The Military Situationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Panics, The Military-Industrial Complex, and The Arms Race

Ungar

1990

The Sociological Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study argues that the generalized fear of the Soviet threat was punctuated by moral panics that provided a signal impetus to the arms race. The growth of the American nuclear arsenal came in three large waves (the Truman, the Eisenhower/ KennedyNcNamara, and the Reagan buildups), the result of panics unleashed by startling and spectacular Soviet challenges to American nuclear hegemony (the Soviet atomic bomb, the Sputnik/Cuban missile crisis, and the window of vulnerability, respectively). The initial panics were instrumental in overcoming the fiscal constraints imposed on the military by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, creating conditions conducive to the ascendency of a military-industrial complex. More specifically, the timing of the panics was determined by authentic surges of fear that in turn provided the political leverage for large-scale nuclear buildups. The direction taken by the panics, however, was determined by the creation and dramatization of an elective affinity between nuclear supremacy and both national security and the sanctity of the American way of life. In contrast with these panics, most efforts to mobilize fear by creating the perception of gaps in the Soviet favor failed.

show abstract

American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision

Cited by 53 publications

References 1 publication

The Renaissance of Security Studies

The Renaissance of Security Studies

Security regimes

Moral Panics, The Military-Industrial Complex, and The Arms Race

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About