Ambivalence and Response Amplification: A Motivational Perspective

Abstract

This research investigated whether ambivalence-induced response amplification occurs because of a motivation to reduce ambivalence. In Study 1, participants' ambivalence toward Native people was assessed and they then read a positive or negative essay on Native land claims. As predicted, ambivalent participants displayed a significant difference between the positive and negative message conditions in their attitudes toward Native people, whereas nonambivalent participants did not. Study 2 followed the same procedure as Study 1 and also included motive manipulation essays designed to manipulate the motivation to reduce ambivalence. The negative motive essay emphasized the disadvantages of seeing both the good and the bad in another person or situation (i.e., ambivalence is negative), whereas the positive motive essay emphasized the advantages (i.e., ambivalence is positive). As predicted, ambivalent participants who received the negative motive manipulation displayed response amplification, whereas ambivalent participants who received the positive motive manipulation did not.

Wanting other attitudes: Actual–desired attitude discrepancies predict feelings of ambivalence and ambivalence consequences

“…Attitudes that are low in ambivalence tend to exhibit strength consequences more than attitudes that are high in ambivalence (Conner & Armitage, 2008). For example, as already noted, ambivalent attitudes are less predictive of behavior (e.g., Conner et al, 2002;Lavine, 2001) and more susceptible to change (e.g., Armitage & Conner, 2000;Bell & Esses, 2002;DeMarree et al, 2011). A new question raised by the current research concerns the extent to which actual-desired attitude discrepancies are associated with strength consequences.…”

“…Because ambivalent attitudes are less functional, people are motivated to reduce feelings of ambivalence, and will often do so by informational means (e.g., Bell & Esses, 2002).…”

“…This is notable in light of research showing that subjective ambivalence is aversive (Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006) and that people are motivated to reduce it (Bell & Esses, 2002;Clark et al, 2008;Maio et al, 1996;Nordgren et al, 2006). This raises the possibility that people might want to regulate their attitudes in much the same way that they regulate other self-aspects.…”

Self‐ambivalence and reactions to success versus failure

“…This hypothesis holds that ambivalence leads to more extreme responses toward the attitude target, depending on situational cues signaling whether a positive or negative response is appropriate. Thus, ambivalent (vs. nonambivalent) people's responses toward the attitude target should depend more strongly on situational cues, whereas nonambivalent people's responses toward the attitude target should be more consistent across situations and less malleable (Bell & Esses, 2002). For example, people with ambivalent attitudes toward Blacks should be more willing to help a friendly Black person than an unfriendly Black person or should find the friendly Black more likeable than the unfriendly Black; these differences in responses should be weaker or absent for persons with nonambivalent attitudes toward Blacks.…”

“…For example, people with ambivalent attitudes toward Blacks should be more willing to help a friendly Black person than an unfriendly Black person or should find the friendly Black more likeable than the unfriendly Black; these differences in responses should be weaker or absent for persons with nonambivalent attitudes toward Blacks. Support for the ambivalence amplification hypothesis has been obtained for several attitude objects (mostly, stigmatized groups such as Blacks, handicapped people, feminists, Native people) and across a wide range of response types (e.g., evaluative judgments concerning the attitude object; helping; intention to hire a member of a certain group in a fictitious job application scenario; administration of electric shocks; e.g., Bell & Esses, 1997, 2002Gibbons, Stephan, Stephenson, & Petty, 1980;Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Eisenstadt, 1991;Jonas, Diehl, & Broemer, 1997;MacDonald & Zanna, 1998;Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996).…”