Ambiguity in Transboundary Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Israeli—Jordanian Water Agreement*

Abstract

Cooperation over transboundary environmental resources, water in particular, has been analyzed from various perspectives. Each study identifies the problems of cooperation differently and suggests different mechanisms to enhance it. Yet, the role of ambiguity, particularly significant in treaty design to resolve environmental disputes, has thus far been overlooked. Such a focus is warranted, since many international agreements regulating the use of natural resources are ambiguous in their schedule of resource delivery during crisis events or in their cost-sharing arrangements and may even include contradictory resource-allocation principles while remaining vague on how to settle the contradictions. This study aims to examine why, when, and how ambiguity is applied in agreements pertaining to natural resources, and water in particular. The Israeli—Jordanian peace agreement, which includes an annex on water-use regulation, is used as a case study. It was found that, under asymmetric power relations, when both sovereignty costs and uncertainty are high, several types of deliberate ambiguity were intentionally incorporated into the treaty. Some ambiguities allowed each side to present the treaty differently at home, thereby defusing domestic opposition, while others provided leeway to adjust the resource allocation during a future crisis without the need to renegotiate the treaty.

Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and cooperation

“…Some unimplemented treaties may stand for so long that their words and the evolving (or devolving) reality experienced on the ground are hopelessly distant, such as the Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal (Gyawali 2001). Fischhendler's (2008) discussion of the deliberate ambiguity built into the water clauses of the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty demonstrates that its resilience may ultimately be less important than its failure to confront the distributional issues which drove the parties together in the first instance.…”

Transboundary water interaction II: the influence of ‘soft’ power

“…Haddadin 2001). Though the water portion of the treaty is heavily skewed clause-by-clause in favour of basin hegemon Israel, 12 the terms of the water clauses of the treaty are publicly declared by Jordanian 12 In discussing the use of ambiguity in treaty-making in the 1994 bi-lateral Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, Fischhendler (2008) notes that-according to ''Israeli accounting''-the Israeli side conceded between 35 and 105 million cubic metres per year of the Jordan River System (including the Yarmouk River), while securing agreement on its established use. A variety of sources estimate the established Israeli use of waters authorities as a national achievement (e.g.…”

“…According to ''Jordanian accounting'', the Israeli side conceded between 225 and 295 million cubic metres per year (Fischhendler 2008). Actual flows from the system used by Jordan around year 2000 were roughly 135 million cubic metres per year, of which only 25-45 are additional releases by Israel (Courcier et al 2005, see also Bílen 2009.…”

Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations

“…There is a broader literature on the effect of treaty design on bilateral bargaining, cooperation and conflict over shared resources, for instance in the area of water-related agreements (e.g. Fischhendler, 2008aFischhendler, , 2008bTir and Stinnett, 2012). But again, this literature primarily focuses on questions of implementation and compliance rather than effects on the future dynamics of the negotiation process itself.…”