Amakudari

Colignon, Richard A.; Usui, Chikako

doi:10.7591/9781501722615

Cited by 62 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…123 Social networks and political organizations may also transmit informal rules. Thus the norms of Amakudari were diffused through social networks that linked universities, state bureaucracies, and private corporations, 124 and informal networks within the Peruvian and Ukrainian states communicated the rules of corruption and blackmail that sustained autocratic regimes during the 1990s. 125 Political parties also carry informal rules.…”

Section: How Informal Institutions Are Created and Communicatedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 In Japan, the "strict but unwritten rules" of Amakudari ("descent from heaven"), through which retiring state bureaucrats are awarded top positions in private corporations, have survived decades of administrative reform. 8 In Central Asia, clan-based norms have "become the rules of the game," while the constitutional structures created after the collapse of the Soviet Union are "increasingly . .…”

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confidence: 99%

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Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda

Helmke¹,

Levitsky²

2004

Persp on Pol

2,029

810

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Mainstream comparative research on political institutions focuses primarily on formal rules. Yet in many contexts, informal institutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, shape even more strongly political behavior and outcomes. Scholars who fail to consider these informal rules of the game risk missing many of the most important incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior. In this article we develop a framework for studying informal institutions and integrating them into comparative institutional analysis. The framework is based on a typology of four patterns of formalinformal institutional interaction: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. We then explore two issues largely ignored in the literature on this subject: the reasons and mechanisms behind the emergence of informal institutions, and the nature of their stability and change. Finally, we consider challenges in research on informal institutions, including issues of identification, measurement, and comparison. ver the last two decades, institutional analysis has become a central focus in comparative politics. Fueled by a wave of institutional change in the developing and postcommunist worlds, scholars from diverse research traditions have studied how constitutional design, electoral systems, and other formal institutional arrangements affect political and economic outcomes.1 These studies have produced important theoretical advances. Nevertheless, a growing body of research on Latin America,2 postcommunist Eurasia,3 Africa,4 and Asia5 suggests

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Section: How Informal Institutions Are Created and Communicatedmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda

Helmke¹,

Levitsky²

2004

Persp on Pol

2,029

810

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…19 There is a striking intersection between the set of longstanding democracies in which the informal side of politics is studied most often and those where governance is widely viewed as defective in some way. Consider research on corruption in Italy 20 or clientelism in Japan, 21 both countries noteworthy also for a tendency to one-party rule. A classic U.S. example is V.O.…”

Section: Formal and Informal Institutions In Political Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies

2012

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Scholars of the developing world have driven a surge of interest in unwritten or informal institutions as determinants of political outcomes. In advanced industrial democracies, by contrast, informal institutions often remain consigned to the analytic margins. This article makes a case for greater attention to informal political institutions in established democracies, and it introduces a theoretical framework to support such analysis. Informal institutions, understood as the unwritten rules of political life, are seen to perform three functions: they complete or fill gaps in formal institutions, coordinate the operation of overlapping (and perhaps clashing) institutions, and operate parallel to formal institutions in regulating political behavior. These three roles of informal institutions are associated with different characteristic patterns of institutional stability and change. The article illustrates its theoretical framework with case studies from American politics, the subfield in which formal-institutional analysis has flourished most. These cases are the historical norm of a two-term presidency (a completing institution), the unwritten rules of the presidential nomination process (coordinating institutions), the informal practice of obstruction in the Senate (a parallel institution), and the normative expectation that presidents should address the public directly (which performs all three functions).

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“…In particular, criticism against “Amakudari” increased. Meaning “descent from heaven,” Amakudari, as a practice, shifted retired bureaucrats to industries related to the public sector work they retired from, creating a strong bond between private and public sectors (Colignon & Usui, ). Senior civil service employees retire before the mandatory retirement age of 60 to join companies linked to or under the jurisdiction of their ministries or agencies (multiple employment with public enterprise or across public and private sectors was often available, called “Watari,” or migratory bird).…”

Section: History Of Maa Pension Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Reform of Mutual Aid Associations in Japan: Civil Service Employee Pension Reform in 2012

Yamamoto

2015

Asian Soc Wrk & Pol Rev

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Civil service employee pension reform began by removing non‐clerical work from the main body of the Mutual Aid Association (MAA) pension system. Further changes were based on administrative reform and pension jealousy. In particular, the Nakasone cabinet's administrative reform privatized the non‐clerical sector. Before the 1979 reform, the pensionable age was 55 for the MAA and 60 for the Employee Pension Insurance (EPI) scheme. The MAA pension benefit formula adopted the final salary system, which was larger than the average lifetime salary calculation used for EPI benefits. The final salary system was abolished during the 1986 reform. Public employee criticism over “Amakudari” led to further civil service employee remuneration reform in 2005. In 2007, the Social Insurance Agency pension record scandal led to a change of government by 2009. The biggest reform of the MAA pension system was the abolishment of the occupational portion of the pension, a compromise between the government and unions. We project that this compromise will cost 22 trillion yen over 90 years old. After 2055, the newly established MAA pension scheme will be abolished; thus the public pension may finally be sustainable.

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Amakudari

Cited by 62 publications

References 0 publications

Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda

Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda

Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies

The Reform of Mutual Aid Associations in Japan: Civil Service Employee Pension Reform in 2012

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