Am I My Brother's Keeper? On Personal Identity and Responsibility

Abstract

The psychological continuity theory of personal identity has recently been accused of not meeting what is claimed to be a fundamental requirement on theories of identityto explain personal moral responsibility. Although they often have much to say about responsibility, the charge is that they cannot say enough. I set out the background to the charge with a short discussion of Locke and the requirement to explain responsibility, then illustrate the accusation facing the theory with details from Marya Schechtman. I aim some questions at the challengers' reading of Locke, leading to an argument that the psychological continuity theory can say all that it needs to say about responsibility, and so is not in any grave predicament, at least not with regard to this particular charge.

The Extreme Claim, Psychological Continuity and the Person Life View

“…And Schechtman now thinks that Locke (while on the face of things following the co-incidence line) can be read as suggesting a theory along the lines of the dependence model (2014: p. 15), something which also seems to bring her more in line with my thinking (Beck 2013a). …”

Technological Fictions and Personal Identity: On Ricoeur, Schechtman and Analytic Thought Experiments

“…Parfit does indeed seem to opt for this model, although his claims in this regard are often tenuously expressed. My version (Beck, 2013a(Beck, , 2013b accepts that practical matters are related to issues of identity, but not as directly as this. You must be the sort of thing that is an agent and can have moral identity, but personal identity is not the same matter.…”